PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETIES AND THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT

While scholars have written extensively on the substantive issues raised by the Internet and the
possible application of copyright in the digital age, collecting societies remain absent from the
discussions. Yet, copyrights would be of little value without the collective management performed by
these societies. In 1986, Dr Arpad Bosh, the then Director General of WIPO, stated that “With
galloping technological developments, collective administration of such rights is becoming an ever
more important way of exercising copyright and neighbouring rights. Taking into account its
increasing importance, much more attention should be paid to it, both at the national and at the
international levels”. The goal of this paper is to address this concern. Based upon a non random
sample of interviews that were conducted in December 2005 and January 2006 with 7 collecting
societies (4 European, 2 North American and 1 Japanese), this exploratory research aims at finding
how collecting societies operate in the digital environment regarding the ubiquitous nature of the
Internet, and what their concerns and perspectives are for the future.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Since England passed the first copyright act, the Statute of Anne in 17101, copyright
has always been confronted by technological innovations. The tremendous impact of the
Internet and its related technological innovations are the latest step in this evolution. Thanks
to the Internet, works can now be disseminated throughout the globe simultaneously at any
given time and reproductions can be made without investment or loss of quality. For these
reasons, the Internet raises several questions about the applicability of copyright to the digital
environment. Quite logically, these issues have led to passionate and disputed discussions
among legal scholars2, and caused governments to adopt new treaties3, an EU directive4 and
national legislation implementing these international agreements.

1

http://www.copyrighthistory.com/anne.html. While the Statute of Ann is often said to have been enacted in
1709, a careful reading of the Act on this website clearly shows that the Act actually was actually enacted in
1710.
2
See, among others : in the US : JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001); in France: ANDRE LUCAS, DROIT
D’AUTEUR ET NUMERIQUE (1998); in Switzerland: LUKAS BÜHLER, URHEBERRECHT IM INTERNET (1999); in
Belgium: SEVERINE DUSSOLLIER, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET PROTECTION DES OEUVRES DANS L’UNIVERS NUMERIQUE –
DROITS ET EXCEPTIONS A LA LUMIERE DES DISPOSITIFS DE VERROUILLAGE DES ŒUVRES (2005) ; in Germany :
STEFAN BECHTOLD, VOM URHEBER- ZUM INFORMATIONSRECHT (2002).
3
WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), known as “Internet
Treaties” (http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/ and http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/). On these
treaties, see: MIHALY MIHALY FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND INTERNET (2002).
4
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonization of
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (hereafter: EC Directive on the
Information
Society),
available
at
(http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001L0029:EN:HTML).

2

So far the music industry has been the most concerned with the online exploitation of
copyrighted works. The importance of digital music is growing each year. The exchange of
music files made possible thanks to the development of p2p systems became a way of life for
millions of consumers. According to the International Confederation of Societies of Authors
and Composers (CISAC)5, 150 billion musical works were transmitted illegally on the
Internet in 2003 (while there were “only” 3 billion in 1999 and 36 billion in 2000)6. While
CISAC does not yet have any figure for 2003, the estimated loss in 2001 for the music
industry was of USD 4.3 billion7.
The p2p phenomenon thus left no choice for the recording industry but to offer a more
consumer friendly business model if it wanted to stop losing revenues. In 2001, Universal and
Sony were the first to open their online music store with “Pressplay”. EMI, AOL/Time,
Warner and BMG followed with “MusicNet”. However, the high prices charged by these
companies and heavy usage limitations proved unlikely to raise the interests of consumers.
Far from having any deterrent effect, the percentage of consumers using p2p exchange files
systems went on rising to reach its peak in May 2003 with 35 million users in a sole month8.
On May 19, 2003, Sony and Universal finally gave up and sold “Pressplay” to Roxio, which

5

As of 2004, CISAC numbers 210 authors' societies from 109 countries and indirectly represents more than 2
million creators within all the artistic repertoires: music, drama, literature, audio-visual works, graphic and visual
arts (http://www.cisac.org).
6
http://www.cisac.org/web/content.nsf/Builder?ReadForm&Page=Article&Lang=FR&Alias=MAN-AR-05.
7
http://www.cisac.org/web/content.nsf/Builder?ReadForm&Page=Article&Lang=EN&Alias=MAN-AR-05.
These figures can of course be disputed and have actually been disputed. See in particular Felix Oberholzer and
Koleman Strumpf, according to whom file sharing would not have any statistically significant effect on
purchases of the average music album and that file sharing probably increases aggregate welfare due to increased
dissemination of music (“The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales. An Empirical Analysis”, at
http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/FileSharing_March2004.pdf).
8
Mary Madden/Lee Rainie, The state of music downloading and file-sharing online (April 2004, Pew Internet &
American Life Project), at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Filesharing_April_04.pdf; see also Mary
Madden/Lee Rainie, The impact of recording industry suits against music file swappers (January 2004, Pew
Internet & American Life Project), at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_File_Swapping_Memo_0104.pdf.
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used it as a base to relaunch the Napster online music store9. One month before, Apple had
however launched in the United States a service that would prove the viability of online music
sales and become a model; this model was iTunes. Unlike previous online music stores,
iTunes has several advantages: it allows a free preview of 30 seconds per song for a price of
USD 0.99 per download, respectively USD 9.99 for an album, an amount that reflected the
projected price announced one year earlier by Jupiter Research, a market research firm10. The
system is easy to use and the à la carte pricing model makes the music store feel like p2p in
certain ways, thanks to fast searching and a one click purchasing mechanism. The DRM used
by Apple, called “FairPlay” has acceptable restraints: users can use the songs downloaded on
five computers and can make unlimited CD burns of their songs11. Most importantly, unlike
its predecessors, Apple has secured the participation of content providers before its release on
the market. Thanks to the support of the majors and over 600 independent labels, iTunes
proposes a catalogue of more than 2 millions songs. ITunes quickly expanded its services to
other countries to cover Europe, Canada, Japan and Australia12. As of February 2006, iTunes
had sold over 1 billion songs, i.e. more than 80% of worldwide online music sales13.

According to Charlie Mc Creevy, European commissioner for internal market and
services, “The digital market for music was worth USD 330 millions in 2004 – estimates
expect it to double in 2005. Analysts predict that digital sales could reach 25% of record

9

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pressplay.
URS GASSER, ITUNES: HOW COPYRIGHT, CONTRACT, AND TECHNOLOGY SHAPE THE BUSINESS OF DIGITAL
MEDIA - A CASE STUDY 9 (2004), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=556802.
11
GASSER, supra note 10, at 11, however points out that one can only burn the same exact playlist seven times in
order to prevent mass-production of copies for illicit sales.
12
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ITunes_Music_Store.
13
Id. For a worldwide listing of the online music stores, see http://www.pro-music.org/musiconline.htm.
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company revenues in five years. 50 million portable music players were sold in 2004,
including 10 million iPods”14.

Both the p2p phenomenon and the development of online music stores raise important
questions as to the management of the online exploitation of copyrighted works. This
exploitation involves several layers of stakeholders. The first layer consists of the right
holders, and they shall be defined more accurately later on when I give a general overview of
the music industry; the second is the users, i.e., the ones who are supposed to request the
authorization to exploit the copyrighted works, in our case the websites’ owners; the third
layer is the computing industry, which designs the software facilitating the widespread
dissemination and/or exchange of copyrighted works on the Internet as well as the technical
protecting devices; the fourth layer is composed of the consumers, who use the Internet to
play the copyrighted works, and the final layer consists of the collective societies, who
manage the exploitation of these works on behalf of the right holders.At first glance, a global
study on the management of copyrighted works involving all the stakeholders could appear to
be the most relevant. Such a study would however suffer several shortcomings. First, all these
layers involve different categories of players. For instance, users develop their activities based
upon different business models: iTunes, an online music store, differs from KaZaa, a p2p
system, which differs in turn from web-broadcasters, i.e., online radio or television stations.
One may thus doubt the validity of any selected sample. Besides, a study taking all the
stakeholders into account might be diluted by trying to represent too many divergent opinions.
A focus on collective societies makes sense for several reasons. First, scholars have yet to

14

http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/copyright/docs/management/rec_crm_en.pdf.
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address the issue of copyright management from the standpoint of collective societies. True,
several scholars have discussed copyright management on the Internet. However, most
publications have been and are focused on the enactment and implementation of legal
provisions related to digital rights management (DRM) as a consequence of the adoption of
the Internet Treaties15. Strangely enough, the question of how collective societies operate in
the digital environment remain absent from any debate among legal scholars. No empirical
research has ever been conducted in this area. In the very first sentence of his seminal book on
collective administration of copyrights, David Sinacore-Guinn writes: “Despite the obvious
importance of collective rights administration and organizations, publications on the legal
aspects of the activities of collective societies and the concepts that govern them are rare”16. I
would add that publications on collective societies in the digital environment are almost
nonexistent. The time has come to fill that void. Secondly, we shall see that, from a
methodological point of view, collective societies are structured upon a similar model
everywhere around the world17. All of them are facing the same problems on the Internet. To
find a representative sample is thus much easier.

The core of this paper is based upon several interviews that were conducted between
December 2005 and January 2006 with executives of the following collective societies: the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast Music Inc.
15

See for instance : in Switzerland : Jacques de Werra, The Legal System of Technological Protection Measures
under the WIPO Treaties, the DMCA, the European Union Directives and other National Legislations (Japan,
Australia), 189 RIDA 66 (2001); in the US: Jane Ginsburg, News from the US: Development in US Copyright
Since the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Part I, 196 RIDA 127 (2003) and Part II, 197 RIDA 77 (2003); in
Belgium: SÉVERINE DUSSOLLIER, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET PROTECTION DES OEUVRES DANS L’UNIVERS NUMÉRIQUE –
DROITS ET EXCEPTIONS À LA LUMIÈRE DES DISPOSITIFS DE VERROUILLAGE DES ŒUVRES (2005).
16
DAVID SINACORE-GUINN, COLLECTIVE ADMINISTRATION OF COPYRIGHTS AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS xli
(1993).
17
See infra Part II: Did you say collective societies ?
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(BMI),

die

Gesellschaft

für

musikalische

Aufführungs-

und

mechanische

Vervielfältigungsrechte (GEMA), la Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de
Musique (SACEM), la Société Suisse pour les droits des auteurs d’oeuvres musicales
(SUISA), la Société Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs (SABAM) as well as the
Japanese Society for Rights of Authors, Composers and Publishers (JASRAC)18. This
selection is based upon the following criteria: The United States, Europe and Japan are the
primary consumers of musical works19, and the paper focuses on countries having a similar
level of copyright protection. Considering recent developments within the European Union20,
it also makes sense to take into consideration not only large European collective societies
such as GEMA and SACEM, but also small ones such as SUISA and SABAM.

II.

DID YOU SAY COLLECTIVE SOCIETIES?
A.

Introduction

1847. The reign of Louis-Philippe was coming to an end. Charles Baudelaire had
published his first translations of Edgar Allan Poe’s works and Honoré de Balzac was about
to finish his Comédie Humaine. The music industry was still far from being an “industry”.
This was still a time when technology played a much lesser role, and when Giuseppe Verdi
18

All interviews but for JASRAC were conducted face-to-face. An interview questionnaire was sent to
JASRAC.
19
According to data collected by Jürgen Meier and Armin Vogel, The Music Industry in the 21st Century –
Facing the Digital Challenge 18 (2002), at http://www.screendigest.com/reports/mi2104/NSMH5SDK6M/sample.pdf, market shares regarding music consumption in the world were divided as follows in 2002:
38.8% for the United States, 29.8% for the European Union and Switzerland (with 6.6% for Germany and 4.6%
for France) and 17.7% for Japan. By comparison, China’s market share for music consumption only amounted to
0.5% (lower than the 0.7% allocated to Switzerland for instance) despite 30.3% of worldwide population.
20
See infra Part IV A 1: How Do Performing Rights Societies Operate in the Digital Environment – Authorized
Distribution Channels: Online Music Stores – From the Sydney Agreement to the EU Recommendation.
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could see his works performed publicly in Teatro alla Scala. The same applied to Ernest
Bourget, whose fame could not be compared to that of Verdi but who, still, also owned
copyrights in his works. On one evening in March 1847, Ernest Bourget was sitting at the
terrasse of the café-théâtre “Les Ambassadeurs” on the Champs-Elysées and enjoying a glass
of eau sucrée. While drinking, Ernest Bourget heard the performance of his composition “Les
Bluettes” in the café. Considering that he had no reason to allow the performance of his work
without compensation, he offered to authorize the owner of the café to perform his work in
return for his drink. The owner refused, Ernest Bourget sued him in front of the Tribunal de
Commerce de la Seine and won the case21. The story would have remained an anecdote if it
had not led to the creation in 1851 of the Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de
Musique, better known as SACEM22, whose main mission is to monitor the works of its
members and distribute the amounts received from the exploitation of these works among
these members. The concept of performing rights society was born23.
Performing right societies quickly spread around Europe: The Societa Italiana degli
Autori ed Editori (SIAE) was created in 1882, the Anstalt für musikalisches Aufführungsrecht
in Germany in 190324. In 1911, SACEM created an office in the United States in an attempt to
enlist American Composers. Americans however had no desire to enroll in a French society
and, on a rainy October night in 1913, nine composers and music publishers led by Nathan
21

This story is depicted by several authors. See for instance: David Peeperkorn, Collecting for “Bluettes”, in
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE SOCIETIES IN THE MUSIC BUSINESS
11 et seq. (1989); MIHALY FICSOR, COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS (2003), at
19 § 28.
22
http://www.SACEM.fr.
23
Actually, the SACEM was not the first collective society in history. In 1791, Beaumarchais had founded the
Société des Auteurs et Compositeurs Dramatiques (SACD) to represent the interests of dramatic authors and
composers to theater owners with respect to performances of their works. In 1837, Honoré de Balzac, Alexandre
Dumas, Georges Sand and Victor Hugo had created the Société des Gens de Lettres de France (SGDL). The
latter one however protects the interests of writers without being a collective society stricto sensu.
24
SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 84.
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Burkan created the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, better known as
ASCAP25.
After performing right societies were flourishing in many countries26, it became clear
that organization on an international basis was required. One way to do it could have been to
open foreign offices with foreign jurisdictions, as SACEM had tried to do in 1911 in the
United States. However, such a solution would have required each user to request a license
from each foreign office to be able to perform that office’s repertoire; it thus had significant
transaction cost and was fairly unpopular among authors27. A preferred approach that quickly
developed and is still being used was for collective societies to enter into reciprocal
representation agreements with each other28. According to these agreements, each society
agrees to represent the interests of the other within its respective territory; instead of
monitoring its sole repertoire, each collective society thus administers a worldwide repertoire
on its territory.
In order to coordinate their work, 18 performing rights societies founded the
International Confederation of Authors and Composers (CISAC) in 192629, whose model
contract has been used since its adoption in 1936 for most if not all reciprocal agreements
concluded among the performing rights societies30. Eighty years after its creation, CISAC

25

PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY 54-55 (rev. ed. 2003); I. Fred Koenigsberg, Performing Rights in
Music and Performing Rights Organizations, Revisited, 50 J. COPR. SOC’Y 355, 376 et seq. (2003).
26
See SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 85.
27
ULRICH UCHTENHAGEN, LA GESTION COLLECTIVE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR DANS LA VIE MUSICALE (2005), at
125 § 672.
28
See on these agreements : SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 645 et seq.
29
http://www.cisac.org/web/Content.nsf/Builder?ReadForm&Page=Article&Lang=EN&Alias=A-USHISTORY&Lang2=EN. See for more information on CISAC: UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 110 et seq., §
582 et seq.
30
UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 113 et seq. § 597 et seq.; FICSOR, supra note 21, at 42 § 87.
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now has 210 members from over 109 countries31. In December 1990, European collective
societies decided that time had come for them to create a group that would be a link between
them and the European institutions. That group is called the European Grouping of Societies
of Authors and Composers (GESAC) and currently counts 34 of the largest author’s societies
in the European Union, Norway and Switzerland, representing nearly 500’000 authors, not
only in the area of music, but also graphic and plastic arts, literary, dramatic and audiovisual
works32.
Performing rights societies have significant economic power. ASCAP currently counts
over 230,000 U.S. composers, songwriters, lyricists, and music publishers as affiliates.
Through agreements with affiliated international societies, it also represents hundreds of
thousands of music creators worldwide33. ASCAP revenues for 2005 amounted to USD 749
millions34. Collective societies worldwide collected over USD 5 billions in 2003, with 90% of
these revenues coming from the music industry35.

B.

Nature and membership

According to Sinacore-Guinn, “collective societies” can be defined as “a legally
cognizable entity whose objectives are to represent the economic and moral interests of
creative rights owners and whose function is to administer, using transactional techniques of a
greater or lesser degree of collectivization, the economic and moral rights of a significant
31

http://www.cisac.org/web/Content.nsf/Builder?ReadForm&Page=Article&Lang=EN&Alias=A-USMEMBER.
32
http://www.gesac.org/eng/gesac/default.htm.
33
http://www.ASCAP.com/about/.
34
http://www.ascap.com/press/2006/031306_financial.html.
35
http://www.cisac.org/web/content.nsf/Builder?ReadForm&Page=Article&Lang=EN&Alias=A-US-CISAC.
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proportion of a nation’s creative rights owners in their works”36. Performing rights societies
are just one type of copyright collective societies and specifically monitor the public
performances of musical works.
With the exception of the United States, collective societies are all regulated by both
provisions in national legislation37 and by their bylaws. While the US Copyright Act does not
specifically discuss performing rights societies, they operate under consent decrees, for
reasons that shall be explained below. Due to the fact that performing rights societies owe
their origins to the actions of individual authors in major industrial nations, they are all private
organizations owned and controlled by their affiliated right owners38; for instance, the board
of directors of ASCAP is composed of 24 directors, 12 of whom are writer members and 12
of whom are publisher members39. The legal status of these societies may vary however;
while ASCAP, JASRAC and GEMA are non-profit associations, BMI, SACEM and SUISA
are corporate entities.
With the exception once again of the United States, where three performing rights
societies coexist, ASCAP, BMI and SESAC40, most collective societies operate as de facto or
de jure41 monopolies within their territory42. This monopolistic situation has at least three
36

SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 10 and 194.
Art. 65-78 of the Belgium Copyright Act, as well as the Royal Decree of April, 6, 1995; Art. L 321-1 to L
321-13 of the French Copyright Act; The German Copyright Administration Law; The Japanese Law on
Intermediary Business Concerning Copyright; Art. 40-60 of the Swiss Copyright Act.
38
FICSOR, supra note 21, at 40 § 79 et seq., 136 § 365 et seq.; SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 16, who
however mentions that collective societies are public entities in the developing countries. See for instance the
Algerian Office national des droits d’auteur et des droits voisins (ONDA), http://www.onda.dz/onda.asp.
39
Art. IV Section 1 of the Articles of Association of ASCAP.
40
For a brief overview of each of these societies, see: James Kendrick, A Short History of Collective Licensing –
Musical Compositions – The American Experience, in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ENTERTAINMENT
LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE LICENSING: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 30 et seq. (2002); DAVID SINACORE-GUINN,
INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO COLLECTIVE ADMINISTRATION ORGANIZATIONS 532 et seq. (1993).
41
Such is the case for instance of Switzerland, where Art. 42.2 of the Swiss Copyright Act provides that
“authorization shall be granted as a rule to one society only for each category of works and to one society for
neighboring rights”.
37
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major advantages43: first, it enables collective societies to grow large enough to effectively
represent their members on a national scale and defend their interests; second, it allows the
appropriate infrastructure to effectively monitor the exploitation of members’ works
throughout the country; and third, users can get a license from a single society rather than
having to ask for permission from several entities. Broad support was expressed in favor of
the dominant if not exclusive position of collective societies during the hearing related to
collective management that took place in Brussels in November 200044.
However, monopolistic or dominant positions also raise some concerns. One may
wonder whether collective societies are allowed to refuse applicants. As a matter of principle,
applicants have to fulfill the requirements contained in the bylaws, i.e., for performing rights
societies, to be an author, composer or publisher. May nationality requirements be used to
exclude prospective members? The answer depends upon the countries. Before 1971, GEMA
used to have bylaws that prohibited the affiliation of non-German citizens. In a decision
rendered on June 2, 197145, the European Court of Justice ruled that those bylaws were
infringing article 86 of the EC Treaty by denying nationals of other Member States the right
to join GEMA. In addition, the Court ruled that Member States had to allow affiliates to limit
the grant of their rights to certain territories as well as entrust the management of their rights
42

Robert du Bois, Principles of tariffs and distribution; some remarks on the most important activities of
authors’ rights societies, in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE
SOCIETIES IN THE MUSIC BUSINESS 68, 71 (1989); SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 16; UCHTENHAGEN, supra
note 27, at 19-20, § 57 et seq.; Herman Cohen Jehoram, The Future of Copyright Collecting Societies, 3 E.I.P.R.
134, 135 (2001).
43
SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 222 et seq., and FICSOR, supra note 21, at 135 § 362 share the same view.
44
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/copyright/management/hearing-collective-mgmt_en.htm. See also
remarks made by Mihaly Ficsor and Gerhard Pfennig in response to Axel aus der Mühlen, in WIPO
INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON THE EXERCISE AND MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS IN
THE FACE OF THE CHALLENGES OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY 91-92 (1998).
45
GEMA I, decision of June 20, 1971, OJ L 134/15. See Jan Corbet, Author’s societies in Europe, in
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE SOCIETIES IN THE MUSIC BUSINESS
22, 26 (1989).
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in different territories to different societies. Similarly, affiliates had to have the right to limit
the grant of their rights to certain categories of rights, and to hand over the administration of
other categories of rights to other societies. This ruling was confirmed three years later in BRT
v. SABAM and Fonior, in which the European Court of Justice ruled that collective societies
had to ensure a balance in their internal rules between “the requirements of maximum
freedom for authors, composers, and publishers to dispose of their works and that of the
effective management of their rights”46.
While very few authors have actually taken advantage of the new provisions to join
different societies for different categories of rights and/or territories47, the situation remains
that any EU author is entitled to join any EU collective society due to the principle of free
movement of persons. However, this principle does not apply in other countries, which still
require a certain relation with their country as a precondition: SUISA for instance requests its
members to demonstrate a close relation with Switzerland, either through citizenship,
residence or in some other way48; going further, JASRAC requests any member to be a
resident of Japan and to have the center of his/her activities in Japan49.
Considering their dominant position, collective societies have to operate based upon
the principle of fair and equitable treatment; in other words, they have no right to treat
applicants placed in similar positions in a different way50. Once an applicant fulfills the
requirements stated in the bylaws, it is almost impossible for a collective society to refuse an

46

Case 127/73, [1974] ECR 313.
Corbet, supra note 45, at 26.
48
Art. 5.1 of the Statutes of SUISA (http://www.SUISA.ch/home_f.htm).
49
http://www.JASRAC.or.jp/ejhp/membership/index.html.
50
See SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 341-342. Art. 45.2 of the Swiss Copyright Act expressly provides
that “they [the collecting societies] shall administer the rights in accordance with fixed rules and with the
requirements of equal treatment”.
47

13

application51. This being said, the issue is only theoretical, because in practice, collective
societies are eager to have as many members as possible to increase their repertoire.
Authors, composers and publishers never have an obligation to adhere to a collective
society, even though affiliation will often be unavoidable with respect to those rights that by
nature or statute cannot be administered individually52. This is one of the main issues
addressed by the consent decrees under which both ASCAP and BMI operate. To understand
how these decrees were enacted, one has to go back to the 1940s. As radio had become more
and more successful in the 1930s, ASCAP, then the sole performing right society in the
United States, had expressed its will to increase its license fees so as to collect more
substantial royalties. Broadcasters claimed that ASCAP was abusing its monopolistic
position. Since ASCAP licenses were to expire on December, 31, 1940, broadcasters decided
to fight against the society on its own territory, and to create a new performing rights society
on their own: that society was Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI). Meanwhile, the Justice
Department had filed an antitrust suit against ASCAP and was willing to file a new one
against both ASCAP and BMI in 1941, alleging eight violations of the Sherman Act. Both
BMI and ASCAP settled the cases53. The consent decrees are the result of these settlements54.
51

On this issue in more detail, see SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 303 et seq.
SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 289; UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 34 § 144; John Morton, Remark in
WIPO INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON THE EXERCISE AND MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING
RIGHTS IN THE FACE OF THE CHALLENGES OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY 35 (1998), according to whom “from the
point of view of musicians, […] it is […] unrealistic to regard the collective management of rights as
exceptional”, and Gerard Gabella in the same volume, at 37.
53
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 25, at 58-60; Kendrick, supra note 40, at 31 and 34; UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at
20 § 62.
54
For ASCAP: United States v. ASCAP, 1940-1943 Trade Cases (CCH), 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), amended by
1950-1951 Trade cases (CCH), 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), amended by 1960 Trade Cases (CCH), 69,912
(S.D.N.Y. 1960), amended by 2001 Civil Action (WCC) 41,1395 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). For BMI: United States v.
BMI, 1940-1943 Trade Cases (CCH) 56,0966 (E.D. Wis. 1941); 1966 Trade Cases (CCH) 71,941 (S.D.N.Y.
1966). On these consent decrees, see: Alfred Schlesinger, Collecting Societies and United States Anti-Trust Law,
in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE SOCIETIES IN THE MUSIC BUSINESS
85 et seq. (1989); Koenigsberg, supra note 26, at 382 et seq.
52
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In its fourth provision, which points out the voluntarily basis of any collective management,
the 2001 consent decree enjoins and restrains ASCAP from “limiting, restricting, or
interfering with the right of any member to issue, directly or through an agent other than a
performing rights organization, non-exclusive licenses to music users for rights of public
performance”. In other words, performing rights can never be assigned on an exclusive basis
in the United States55.
The situation differs in Europe, where rights are usually assigned on an exclusive basis
to the societies. These exclusive assignments have been challenged there as well however. In
1993, the Irish rock band U2 and their publishers challenged PRS’ rules, according to which
their live performance right had to be assigned on an exclusive basis56. According to the band,
they would be better served if they were able to administer this right on their own for at least
two reasons: self-administration would obviate the need to pay any administrative and social
deductions57, and they would get paid for their performances much faster than the three year
period they faced at PRS. PRS refused to forego the assignment, believing that selfadministration was not only impossible but contrary to the band’s interests. Confronted with
this refusal, U2 brought an action before the High Court of Justice for abuse of dominant
position by PRS in February 1994. The proceedings were delayed due to an investigation that
55

Andre Schmidt, Contracts and Powers of Representation of Collecting Societies, in INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE SOCIETIES IN THE MUSIC BUSINESS 54, 57-58 (1989);
Koenigsberg, supra note 25, at 379.
56
PRS is an acronym for the UK performing rights society. The following explanations are based upon the two
following contributions: Crispin Evans & Nathalie Larrieu, Collective Licensing Today (non digital media) –
Performing Rights: The Licensor Experience – Live Performances: the PRS Experience, in INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE LICENSING: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 61 et seq.
(2002); Euan Lawson, Collective Licensing Today (non digital media) – Performing Rights: The Licensee
Experience – Live Performances: Collecting Societies and the Public Performance Right, in INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE LICENSING: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 89, 92 et
seq. (2002).
57
As to these deductions, see infra Part II D: Did you Say Collective Societies - Accounting and distributing
royalties.
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began on October 13, 1994 under the auspices of the British Monopolies and Mergers
Commission. In February 1996, the Commission determined that the exclusive assignment
was not mandated by the members’ interests and was in violation of GEMA and BRT
mentioned previously. Based upon this outcome, the parties finally settled. As a result, PRS
amended its statutes and introduced a general scheme under which it would grant each
member a license for live performances upon request wherever and whenever the
performance takes place; in addition, PRS engaged itself to pay the royalties directly to the
publishers and writers within 30 days of the date of the concert. On August 6, 2002, the
European Commission confirmed the opinion of the British Monopolies and Mergers
Commission in Banghalter, and held that a mandatory assignment of all the author’s rights,
including as to their online exploitation, would amount to an abuse of dominant position
within the meaning of article 82(a) of the E.C. Treaty58. Therefore, while nobody has ever
contested the right for members to leave a society and adhere to another one59, U2 and
Banghalter made it clear that authors also have the right not to adhere to any performing right
society at all.
Considering the monopolistic or at least dominant position occupied by European
performing rights societies, antitrust analysis plays a significant role in the way these societies
perform their duties. Antitrust suits against performing rights societies have been filed in both

58

Banghalter and Homem Christo v. SACEM, decision of August 6, 2002, case COMP/C2/37.219, available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37219/fr.pdf.
59
According to UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 48 § 226, SUISA, which administers the worldwide register of
composers, authors and editors technically called CAE/IPI (standing for “Compositeurs, Auteurs,
Editeurs”/Interested Party Information), would transfer over 100’000 affiliations from one society to another
each year.
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Europe60 and the United States61. In most countries, the governmental control is not limited to
judicial supervision however. Additional regulation usually comes from two sources: first, the
control of copyright royalty tribunals over rate schedules, such as in Germany, Switzerland or
the United States62. While these tribunals only intervene when stakeholders cannot reach an
agreement in Germany and in the United States, it always has to approve the rate schedules in
in Switzerland; in practice, such approval is automatic when stakeholders have reached a
consensus. Neither Belgium nor Japanese laws require any governmental approval of the
rates, but both countries nevertheless communicate their rates to public entities: to the
Ministry of Economical Affairs in Belgium63, and to the Agency for Cultural Affairs in
Japan64. Secondly, in all countries under scrutiny but the United States, the operations of
performing rights societies are supervised by a public entity65.
After having discussed the nature and legal framework under which performing rights
societies operate, we now turn more specifically to their duties.

60

See Jean-Francois Bellis, Collecting societies and EEC law, in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE SOCIETIES IN THE MUSIC BUSINESS 78 et seq. (1989). For instance: BRT
v. SABAM and Fonior, Case 127/73 [1974] ECR 313; Greenwich Films v. SACEM, Case 22/79, [1979] ECR
3275; GVL v. Commission, Case 7/82, [1983] ECR 483; Musik Vertrieb Membran v. GEMA, Case 55/88, [1981]
ECR 147.
61
CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F.Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev’d, 562 F.2d 130 (2nd Cir. 1977), rev’d, BMI v. CBS, 441
U.S. 1 (1979); BMI v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F.Supp. 758 (D.Del 1981), aff’d mem., 691 F.2d (3d Cir. 1982);
ASCAP v. Showtime, 912 F.2d 563 (2nd Cir. 1990); Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v. BMI, 772 F.Supp. 614
(D.D.C. 1991).
62
Art. 14 of the German Copyright Administration Law; Art. 46.3 of the Swiss Copyright Act; § 801 of the US
Copyright Act. See as to these tribunals: SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 428 et seq.
63
Interview with SABAM (December, 22, 2005).
64
SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 431.
65
These entities can vary: the Patent Office in Germany (Art. 18 of the German Copyright Administration Law);
the Federal Institute of Intellectual Property in Switzerland (Art. 52 of the Swiss Copyright Act); the Ministry of
Justice in Belgium (Art. 76 of the Belgium Copyright Act); the Ministry of Culture and a special Commission in
France (Art. L 321-3, L 321-9, L 321-12 and L 321-13 of the French Copyright Act). See on this control: du
Bois, supra note 59, at 71-72; Nanette Rigg, A Short History of Collective Licensing – Musical Compositions –
The European Perspective : Collective Management of Rights in Europe From 1777 to 2002. Why is it
necessary ?, in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE LICENSING: PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE 18, 24-25 (2002); FICSOR, supra note 21, at 144 et seq. § 395 et seq. ; SINACORE-GUINN,
supra note 16, at 519 et seq.; UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 12-13 §§ 11 et seq.
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C.

Granting Licenses

The licenses granted by performing rights societies have one specific feature: they
cover the whole repertoire monitored by the society, i.e. both its members’ repertoire as well
as those of its sister societies based upon the executed reciprocal agreements. The delivery of
a license for some musical works at the exclusion of others is therefore impossible66. Such
licenses are called “blanket licenses”. In other words, users will be allowed to exploit “any of
the works in the collective’s repertoire upon payment of a fixed fee, without distinction as to
the actual works used”67. While this may be at the advantage of most users, others might be
interested in a couple of works only and thus unwilling to pay for the whole repertoire. Such
was the case in particular of local television stations in the United States during the 1980s.
These stations considered blanket licenses to be an unreasonable restraint of trade, and
therefore brought an antitrust suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New-York. The District Court ruled in favor of the local television stations. On appeal, the
Court reversed and ruled that blanket licenses were not an unreasonable restraint on trade
where the opportunity to acquire individual rights through program license, direct license, or
source license was realistically available to the station, as in this case68. In Europe, the French
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Certain countries, in particular the United States, allow the deliverance of “per program licenses” which, as
their name indicates, consists of licenses for a particular program only. However, there again, the license covers
the worldwide repertoire (FICSOR, supra note 21, at 43 § 89; SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 388).
67
du Bois, supra note 42, at 69; Gunnar W.G. Karnell, Collecting societies in music, in INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE SOCIETIES IN THE MUSIC BUSINESS 15, 17 (1989);
SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 20-21, and at 382 et seq.; Koenigsberg, supra note 25, at 375 and 387;
UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 19-20 § 53 et seq.; FICSOR, supra note 21, at 43 § 88.
68
Buffalo Broadcasting Co v. ASCAP, 744 F.2d 917 (2nd Cir. 1984).
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Cour de cassation also ruled in 1985 and 1987 that the delivery of blanket licenses by
SACEM did not amount to an abuse of dominant position69.
The policies and operations of performing rights societies are governed by the
principal of fair and equal treatment70, meaning they are not allowed to treat similar users in
similar positions differently. In Tournier, The European Court of Justice made it clear that
collecting societies may not engage in a concerted action having the effect of systematically
refusing to grant direct access to their repertoires to users located in foreign territories, a
possible justification for such a refusal being the impracticality of setting up a monitoring
system in the foreign territory71. In its article 11.1, the German Copyright Administration Law
even provides that “collecting societies shall be required to grant exploitation rights or
authorizations to any person so requesting on equitable terms in respect of the rights they
administer”.
To avoid any discrimination, performing right societies will try and negotiate rates
schedules with diverse categories of users for the different types of exploitations possible72.
Several criteria are relevant to these negotiations73. First, performing rights societies will try
to find out whether existing rate schedules can apply to a new channel of distribution, a
criterion which obviously plays an important role on the Internet; for instance, the rate
schedules applied to webcasting are the same as the ones for radio broadcasting. When there
is no similar existing business model on the market, which was the case for music on demand
a few years ago, the societies will try to consider the royalty rates charged by sister societies
69

SARL Le Xénon v. SACEM, Cass. civ. I, decision of April 16, 1985; Société Générale de la Ferme c. SACEM,
Cass. civ. I, decision of June 23, 1987.
70
UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 32-33 § 133 et seq., as well as 61-62 § 301 et seq. and 85-86 § 455 et seq.
71
Ministère Public v. Tournier, decision of July 13, 1989, case 395/87, ECR (1989) 2521.
72
FICSOR, supra note 21, at 44 § 90; Koenigsberg, supra note 25, at 385.
73
See, in general, du Bois, supra note 42, at 74; SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 412 et seq.
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for similar types of licenses in foreign countries74. Considering the global reach of the
exploitation, especially on the Internet, performing rights societies cannot ignore the rates that
have been set by their sister societies. Users may not understand why rates would
significantly differ from one country to another for a similar business model, and societies
would find it hard to justify such differences. More than that, the European Court of Justice
expressly ruled in 1989 in Lucazeau that the imposition of significantly higher tariffs than
those applicable in other Member States would constitute an abuse of dominant position,
unless the differences are justified by objective and relevant factors75. For these reasons, rates
for music on demand appear to be similar if not identical in most countries76. Second, the
rates will depend upon the type of exploitation; a user who features music as a primary
attraction, for instance in a concert hall, will obviously pay more for a musical performing
rights license than a user who supplies music as background for its customers, such as in a
restaurant or a hotel; in other words, “a collective will analyze each industry according to how
it uses the creative work, how it earns its income, and what it can afford”77. Finally,
performing rights societies will negotiate these rates keeping in mind a traditional rule of
thumb recommended by CISAC since 195478, according to which the maker of a work
participates with ten percent of the profits of that work79; this rule is even expressly
mentioned in article 60.2 of the Swiss Copyright Act80.
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UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 74 § 387.
Lucazeau v. SACEM, decision of July 13, 1989, cases 110/88 and 241/88, ECR (1989) 2811.
76
See infra Part IV A 4: How Do Performing Rights Societies Operate in the Digital Environment – Authorized
Distribution Channels – Current Practice of Performing Rights Societies.
77
SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 414. The performance of music in restaurants and cafés was held to be for
profit in 1917; see Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 591, 37 S.Ct. 232 (1917) and its depiction by
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 25, at 55-56.
78
UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 71 § 367.
79
As to this rule, see : UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 69 et seq., § 354 et seq. One will then have to apply this
rule depending upon several circumstances. For instance, for public concerts, performing rights societies will
75
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Needless to say, numerous rate schedules coexist, covering a wide range of
performances depending either upon the type of location, such as nightclubs, concerts,
restaurants, hotels, or the type of media used, such as radio, television, cable, analog or digital
players, blank tapes, CDs or DVDs, cell phones or the Internet81. For instance, in 2006,
GEMA counted more than 70 different rate schedules82.

D.

Accounting and Distributing Royalties

At regular intervals, the periodicity of which depends upon the licensing terms of each
collective society83, users will have to complete report forms recording the use they made of

have to evaluate the amount of music which is copyrighted and the one which belongs to the public domain.
When protected musical works are performed during a third of a concert, the rate will be of 3.3%. If half the time
of a radio broadcasting is devoted to the performance of protected musical works, the appropriate rate will
amount to 5% (i.e. 10% of 50%) of the gross income of the radio broadcaster.
80
Both the Swiss and US Copyright Act try to provide some guidance in the establishment of these rate
schedules. Art. 60 of the Swiss Copyright Act reads as follows: “1. When determining compensation, account
shall be taken of: (a) the proceeds obtained from use of the work, performance, phonogram or videogram or
broadcast or, subsidiarily, the outlay involved in the use; (b) the nature and quantity of the works, performances,
phonograms or videograms or broadcasts used; (c) the ratio of protected to unprotected works, performances,
phonograms or videograms or broadcasts, and other services; 2. Compensation shall normally amount to a
maximum of 10 percent of the proceeds from or cost of utilization for authors’ rights and a maximum of 3
percent for neighboring rights; however, it shall be determined in such a way that, subject to economic
administration, the entitled persons receive equitable remuneration”. Section 801 (b) 1 of the US Copyright Act
provides that: “[…]. The rates applicable […] shall be calculated to achieve the following objectives: (a) to
maximize the availability of creative works to the public; (b) to afford the copyright owner a fair return for his
creative work and the copyright user a fair income under existing economic conditions; (c) to reflect the relative
roles of the copyright owner and the copyright user in the product made available to the public with respect to
the relative creative contribution, technological contribution, capital investment, cost, risk, and contribution to
the opening of new markets for creative expression and media for their communication; (d) to minimize any
disruptive impact on the structure of the industries involved and on generally prevailing industry practices”.
81
ASCAP : http://www.ASCAP.com/licensing/generallicensing.html; BMI: http://www.bmi.com/licensing/;
JASRAC:
GEMA:
http://www.GEMA.de/engl/customers/;
SABAM:
http://www.JASRAC.or.jp/ejhp/provisions/pdf/tariffs02.pdf;
SACEM:
http://www.SABAM.be/website/fr/home.htm;
http://www.SACEM.fr/portailSACEM/jsp/ep/home.do?tabId=2; SUISA: http://www.SUISA.ch/home_f.htm (see
“utilisateurs”, then “tarifs”).
82
http://www.GEMA.de/engl/customers/schnellsuche.shtml.
83
The periodicity of the report forms delivered by users to performing rights societies should not be mistaken
with the periodicity of the distribution of royalties. To take an example, ASCAP distributes the royalties to the
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the repertoire. The forms differ depending upon the collective society as well as the type of
activities carried out84. There is no international standard for reporting requirements which
can differ for each society and each country. To make sure that users comply with these
requirements, performing right societies maintain staffs of inspectors to identify potential
users and audit users’ accounting from time to time85.
Considering the fact that performing rights societies deliver blanket licenses, they will
receive from users a global amount of money that will have to be allocated as fairly as
possible to the different rights holders. Before this allocation actually takes place, societies
will take a certain percentage of royalties to cover their costs86; these costs may vary in a
range from 10-20% of the collected amount. After having covered their expenses, performing
rights societies will distribute the remaining royalties among the rights holders. To do this,
they basically have two options. They can request the users to keep records of all the works
used in a given period of time; this method is feasible when the amount of works involved is
limited87. European performing rights societies tend to rely on complete census as much as
can be. This is not the system chosen in the United States however, where performing rights
societies consider that it would be prohibitively costly for several types of activities to keep
track of all the works that have been performed; such a complete census is in particular
unpopular for mass uses of works, because of the substantial transaction costs of assembling
writers and publishers 8 times a year (4 times for the domestic distribution and 4 times for the international
distribution) (http://www.ascap.com/about/payment/distribution.html); SUISA does it 14 times a year.
84
For examples of report forms, see: ASCAP: http://www.ascap.com/licensing/generalreports.html; BMI:
http://www.bmi.com/licensing/forms/Hotel%20_report.pdf (regarding public performances in hotels); SABAM:
http://www.sabam.be/website/fr/012005.htm.
85
SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 442-443.
86
As to these administrative costs and expenses, see SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 448 et seq.;
UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 105 § 558 et seq.
87
For instance, a theatre will have no problem keeping records of all the movies that have been played during a
year and for how long. According to Ficsor, a complete census generally takes place for concerts, recitals of
classical music and certain other live concerts and events (FICSOR, supra note 21, at 46 § 97).
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information on those uses88. Thus, as explained by ASCAP, it will conduct a complete count
of performances in a medium whenever the cost of collecting and processing accurate
performance information is a low enough percentage of the revenues generated by that
medium89. As an alternative, US performing rights societies have developed sampling
methods that are designed to be a statistically accurate representation of performances in a
medium90.
Generally speaking, distribution rules are fairly complicated. As an example, the
German rules cover more than a hundred pages…For obvious reasons, I shall not go into the
details of these regulations. While these methods may vary from one type of activity to
another and from one performing rights society to another, they can be summarized as
follows:
Whether they apply a complete census or sampling method, performing rights
societies will try to break down their market according to revenue sources. These
classifications may vary from one society to another: while SUISA has identified twelve
primary sources of revenues, such as national public network, private networks, cable
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SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 444.
http://www.ascap.com/about/payment/keepingtrack.html. This is for instance possible in the licensing of
mechanical rights, where the Harry Fox Agency can require the exact number of copies of phonograms sold that
embody the works.
90
According to Massarsky, while presenting some advantages, these sampling methods would nevertheless
suffer four main drawbacks : first of all, it obviously misses all of the performances of a work; secondly, it can
overcompensate certain performances through the statistical multiplier effect that extrapolates the sample to the
universal value; thirdly, it can misappropriate the ranking of certain performances, in particular the activity of
songs that are just below the hit level; finally, certain genres such as Latino or Country create poor proxies under
the sample method since they should be subdivided into several categories (tropical, Mexican, tejano and pop for
instance as far as Latino music is concerned) (Barry Massarsky, Collective Licensing Today [non digital media]
– Performing Rights: The Licensor Experience – Feature Broadcasts: the “Great” Debate Surrounding PRO
Radio Sampling, in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE LICENSING:
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 67, 70-71 [2002]). These concerns are shared by Ficsor, who also points out the fact
that performing rights societies may influence the distribution of remuneration in favour of certain categories of
works (FICSOR, supra note 21, at 46 § 98).
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networks, etc.91, GEMA has identified tw
enty

92

. All these revenue sources will allow the

creation of royalty pools such as television, radio, concert, motion picture or foreign
income93. The creation of these pools are based upon what ASCAP traditionally refers to as
the “follow the dollar principle”, according to which the money collected from particular
source of revenues is paid out to members for performances of their works on television and
money collected from radio stations is paid out for radio performances94.
Once these royalty pools have been precisely identified, the next step in accounting for
and distributing royalty income will be to identify the number of times each work has been
performed in a given pool. To do this, performing rights societies correlate the data obtained
through their monitoring with their own documentation; this process is known as rendez-vous
and is handled by computers. In practice, “a title match process requires that users report their
uses via a computer readable data carrier compatible with the computer system owned and
operated by the collective and formatted in conformity with the collective’s data records. The
collective will then use a specially designed software to perform the rendez-vous”95.
From then on, one has to make a distinction between the complete census model
usually referred to by European performing rights societies, and the sampling model used by
the US societies:
European performing rights societies consider the length of time a musical work has
been performed as the main criterion to calculate the shares of royalties to be distributed to
the rights holders. In other words, for performances on radio or television stations for
91

Art. 4.1 Distribution Rules of SUISA
Art. VIII Ausfürhungsbestimmungen zum Verteilungsplan der GEMA für das Aufführungs- und Senderecht.
93
SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 468. These were the pools used in 1991 by the Society of Composers,
Authors, and Music Publishers of Canada (SOCAN).
94
Kendrick, supra note 40, at 32. See on these pools: UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 93-94 § 502 et seq.
95
SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 460; UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 91 et seq. § 488 et seq.
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instance, the societies will take into account the length of the broadcasting and the number of
times the musical work has been performed.

Example96
Let us imagine that a broadcaster pays an annual fee of USD 200’000 for the use of copyrighted works.
If his report mentions a total of 142’027 works performed for a total lapse of time of 454’486 minutes,
each minute performed will have a value of USD 0.44 (200’000/454’486). If your work has been
performed for a total of 17 minutes by this broadcaster, your royalty will amount to USD 7.48.

In most cases, United States performing rights societies will not measure the actual use
of each musical work within a given pool. Instead, a certain number of credit value will be
given to each musical work. To weigh these credits, several criteria are used, such as the
genre of the music and the place where it is played, because “The economic value of a
featured musical performance is greater to a user than is the value that user might attach to the
use of music as background for either a commercial or a dramatic program”97. ASCAP’s
distribution rules are very detailed as to how different types of use are weighed differently98;
while the duration of the performance is taken into consideration as in Europe99, section VI
of ASCAP’s distribution rules make a distinction between musical works performed as
“theme”, “background music”, “jingle”, “cue music”, “bridge music” or “feature
96

See UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 95 § 508.
SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 466.
98
As to ASCAP sampling method in particular, see: Koenigsberg, supra note 25, at 394 et seq.
99
See Art. VII lit. E and F Distribution Rules of ASCAP (Weighing Formula); Art. 53 Distribution Rules of
SACEM ; Art. 3.2.1 Distribution Rules of SUISA; Art. X to XII Ausfürhungsbestimmungen zum Verteilungsplan
der GEMA für das Aufführungs- und Senderecht. For a criticism of ASCAP’s subjective value judgment basis
for valuing different types of music instead of focusing mainly on an objective durational basis as European
performing rights societies, see Paul Katz, Collective Licensing Today (non digital media) – Performing Rights:
The Licensor Experience – Background Uses: Collective Licensing of Background Music Today, in
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE LICENSING: PAST, PRESENT AND
FUTURE 73, 75 (2002).
97
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performance”100. The time of the day when the music was performed is also taken into
account for television programs101. Once a credit value has been assigned to all of the works
in a given pool, the total number of credits will be divided into the amount of royalties
collected in this pool to create a monetary value for each credit102.

Example
Let us imagine that, luckily for you, your musical work becomes a “hit”. It is performed nationwide
several times a day on numerous radio stations, totaling a number of 10’000 performances in three
months. Let us imagine that the applicable distribution rules consider that the performance of a musical
work on radio carries 2 credits103. Consequently, your number of credits for the performances of that
particular work on radio stations will be 20’000 (10’000 x 2). Let us imagine that the total number of
credits in the radio pool amounts to 1 million. If the global amount of royalties collected from the users
assigned in this radio pool is of USD 5 million, the monetary value for each credit will be USD 5. Since
you have 20’000 credits in the radio pool, you are entitled to recover USD 100’000 from that pool (i.e.
20’000 x 5).

The truth is that, whether in Europe or in the United States, you will never recover this
global amount. First of all, as mentioned previously, performing rights societies will deduct a
certain percentage of the collected royalties to cover their administrative costs and expenses.
Secondly, collective societies play an important role in the areas of social, educational and
cultural activities, especially in Europe. These societies are indeed concerned with the
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http://www.ascap.com/reference/drd_rev060705.pdf.
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du Bois, supra note 42, at 76; SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 468.
103
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applicable rules.
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protection of their domestic repertoire and cultural diversity. To protect and encourage their
own members, performing rights societies have thus developed and implemented pension and
welfare plans that are subsidized thanks to a deduction upon the amount of royalties
collected104. While this social deduction may seem justified, it is fairly controversial in the
international arena. One of the principal problems is that funds are taken from the total
amount of royalties collected, including foreign owners who usually generate far more money
than domestic members in Europe; yet, domestic affiliates will ultimately be the only ones to
enjoy the benefits of these funds, at the exclusion of foreign authors who have to suffer this
deduction from their income without any compensation in return105. Thus, as strange as it may
seem, while the need for financial support from European performing rights societies is partly
due to the predominance of the US repertoire106, the fund itself happens to be mainly funded
thanks to the exploitation of this foreign repertoire. As a compromise, the CISAC Model
Contract allows each society to deduct up to ten percent of the sums that would otherwise be
payable to a foreign collective for use in social, cultural and educational programs107. This
deduction did not remain unchallenged; in 1994, the British Academy of Songwriters,
104

On these issues, see du Bois, supra note 42, at 75; Rigg, supra note 65, at 25-26; SINACORE-GUINN, supra
note 16, at 477 et seq.; Peter Lerche, Rechtsfragen der Verwirklichung kultureller und sozialer Aufgaben bei der
kollektiven Wahrnehmung von Urheberrechten, insbesondere im Blick auf den sogen. 10%-Abzug der GEMA, in
GEMA
Jahrbuch
1997/1998,
available
at
http://www.gema.de/kommunikation/jahrbuch/jahr_97_98/feature/teilc.shtml#iii4b, who considers that such a
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Composers and Authors, joined by PRS in 1996, complained that GEMA’s deductions from
non-German repertoire was in breach of European antitrust legislation as the deductions
discriminated against non-German authors108. PRS however never brought its complaint into
Court109 and, today, most if not all collective societies still deduct close to ten percent of the
collected royalties for social purposes110.

Example:
Let us go back to our previous example and imagine that the collective society deducts 10% of the
collected royalties to cover its administrative costs and expenses, plus 10% for its social funds. The
allocation among the right holders will take place upon the remaining amount, i.e. USD 80’000.

This does still not mean that you will be entitled to recover the entire USD 80’000.
One has to find out how many people have rights upon the musical works performed. In most
cases, a musical composition involves at least three categories of right holders: a composer, a
music arranger and a lyricist. The three will be entitled to receive a certain share of the
royalties. Statutory rules regulating the distribution among rights holders are exceptional.
Such an example can be found at § 114 (g) of the US Copyright Act, which however deals
with sound recordings at the exclusion of musical works; according to this provision, 45% of
the money paid by noninteractive webcasters for the right to broadcast sound recordings over
the Internet must be paid to featured artists, 2.5% to nonfeatured musicians, 2.5% to
nonfeatured vocalists and the remaining 50% to the companies holding the sound-recording

108

Rigg, supra note 65, at 26.
Information provided by GEMA.
110
Art. XVII Section 1 lit. b Articles of Association of ASCAP; § 1.4 lit. a Distribution Rules of GEMA; Art. 33
Statutes of SACEM; Art. 8.3.6 Statutes of SUISA;
109

28

copyrights111. In most cases, unless you have an agreement stipulating the way the
distribution should be made among yourselves regarding your musical work, and such
agreements are allowed - which is not the case in all countries - the distribution rules of the
concerned performing rights society will apply. In practice, rights holders usually voluntarily
submit themselves to the default distribution rules112. Since each performing rights society is
free to adopt its own distribution rules113, these rules will vary depending upon the type of use
and the concerned society114. If we refer to our example and admit, hypothetically, that the
amount has to be shared equally with your arranger and lyricist, which is the default rule of
SACEM distribution scheme, you will be entitled to receive USD 26’666. Once you get your
money you will still have to share it with your publisher, in accordance with the agreement
you have with him.
Now that the principles governing the performance of collecting societies have been
presented, time has come to wonder how these societies try to reconcile their territorial
structure with the needs of an online environment without any border.

III.

HOW DO PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETIES OPERATE IN THE DIGITAL
ENVIRONMENT?

A.

Authorized Distribution Channels: Online Music Stores
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1.

From the Sydney Agreement to the EU Recommendation

Collective societies have been organized on a territorial basis since their inception,
meaning that users115 have to acquire a separate license in each country where works will be
performed. As discussed previously, cooperation occurs via reciprocal agreements that allow
performing rights societies to monitor a worldwide repertoire in their territory116. This model
was a viable solution in the analog era, but is outdated now that cross-border trading of
copyrighted works has become the rule. The need to adapt existing structures to the
specificities of the digital environment is particularly felt in the European Union, where users
may have to seek permission from 25 different performing rights societies. In contrast, users
in the United States only need licenses from ASCAP, BMI and SESAC. As stated by Charlie
McCreevy, European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, “Europe’s model of
copyright clearance belongs more to the nineteenth century than to the 21st. Once upon a time
it may have made sense for the member state to be the basic unit of division. The internet
overturns that premise”117. For this reason, we shall focus our attention on European
performing rights societies and refer to Japan and the United States for a comparative
perspective.
This European focus does not mean that US performing rights societies do not feel
constrained by their structures. ASCAP, BMI and the Harry Fox Agency actually tried to
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request an antitrust exemption for a “uni-license proposal” in 2005. This proposal would have
led to the creation of an agency to deliver one license to digital users for performing and
mechanical rights regarding musical works in the United States. The money collected would
have been divided amongst the societies and then distributed to their respective members.
Unfortunately, the stakeholders could not reach agreement about the applicable rate, because
the societies felt that users’ demands were “ludicrous”. As a result, multiple licenses granted
by multiple societies remains the model in the United States.
In spite of Mr McCreevy’s words, Internet Age is not the first time that European
collective societies have been confronted with cross-border trading in copyrighted works. A
centralization trend already exists in the field of phonogram production; since large
phonogram manufacturers are concentrating their production in a few countries, they are
given “central licenses” by the society of the country where the production or distribution of
these copies takes place118. This is made possible thanks to negotiations among the different
societies responsible for the granting of mechanical licenses.
The advent of direct broadcasting satellites in the 1980s also allowed transmission of
copyrighted programs to several countries. To deal with these cross-border activities before
the enactment of the E.C. Cable and Satellite Directive in 1993119, CISAC adopted in 1987 an
addendum to its model contract concerning direct broadcasting satellites, usually referred to
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as the Sydney Agreement120. According to this Agreement, licenses to broadcast the programs
are delivered by the society of the originating country. If the broadcasts are communicated to
several countries, the collective societies of the concerned countries have two alternatives:
either agree that the license granted by the originating country is valid for all countries, or
require that extraterritorial validity is subject to their approval, and then define the conditions
under which such cross-border authorizations might be delivered for their respective country.
The Sydney Agreement was used as a model by the International Federation of the
Phonographic Industry (IFPI) for the “Simulcast” Agreement in 2002121. The “Simulcast”
Agreement intends to facilitate the grant of international licenses to radio and TV
broadcasters to engage in simulcasting122. Given that simulcasting on the Internet involves the
simultaneous transmission of a signal to several countries, a multi-license model seemed
appropriate. The parties to the Agreement thus developed a “one stop shopping” license
scheme, according to which simulcasters located in the European Economic Area (EEA) can
obtain a multi-territorial license from any collective society in the EEA which is party to the
Agreement, and then simulcast into the signatories’ territories123.
According to Article 81(1) of the E.C. Treaty, concerted practices among undertakings
which may affect trade between Member States are however prohibited. Since collective
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societies are undertakings within the meaning of Article 81(1) of the E.C. Treaty due to their
monopolistic position, the Simulcast Agreement was considered a concerted practice.
However, Art. 81 (3) of the E.C. Treaty permits exemptions where the agreement contributes
to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit. Parties to the
Simulcast Agreement requested such an exemption from the European Commission. The
Commission decided that the Agreement, which gave rise to a new product, i.e., a multiterritorial simulcasting license, was responding to a need in the digital environment and was
thus justified124. While granting the exemption, the Commission nevertheless required
collective societies to disclose separately the amount charged to users for the copyright
royalty on one side, and for the administration fee on the other125. Implicitly, the Commission
believed that by turning the traditional single license model into a multi-territorial one, users
were to be able to choose among several collective societies that competed on cost and
efficiency. The Simulcast decision proves that, since 2002, the desire to enhance competition
among collective societies is a major priority in the European Commission’s regulation of
copyright management.
Due to different goals among CISAC’s members, performing rights societies did not
immediately reach an agreement similar to the Sydney Agreement to deal with the online
exploitation of musical works. However, in 2000, five societies (BMI, BUMA (Netherlands),
GEMA, PRS and SACEM) adopted an Agreement during CISAC Congress at Santiago de
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Chile, known as the Santiago Agreement126. According to the Agreement, users were allowed
to get a multi-territorial license from the performing rights society in their country of
economic residence, i.e., the country of their residence from which they conduct their
activities. Over forty additional societies quickly joined the Santiago Agreement, and in
September 2001, at its congress in Barcelona, BIEM’s affiliates adopted an identical
Agreement known as the “Barcelona Agreement” to deal with mechanical reproduction rights.

These agreements received unanimous support from performing rights societies, not
only in Europe, but also in Japan and in the United States. While the Santiago and Barcelona
Agreements were following the trend, initiated by the Simulcast Agreement, to allow multiterritorial licenses, they contained one main difference that would ultimately lead to their
demise: unlike the Simulcast Agreement, users could not acquire a license from any
performing rights society but had to seek permission from the society in their country of
economic residence. In other words, enhanced competition among collective societies, as
envisioned in the Simulcast Agreement, could not be achieved in the Santiago and Barcelona
Agreements because users were unable to choose their society. For this reason, on May 17,
2001, the Commission published a Notice on these Agreements and invited interested third
parties to submit observations127. On the basis of the comments received, the Commission
issued a Statement of Objections on April 29, 2004. In this Statement, the Commission ruled
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that the exclusive competence of a single society in any given case128 did not create any
incentive for performing rights societies to increase efficiency or reduce their costs. The
cross-licensing arrangements foreseen in these Agreements thus led to an effective lock up of
national territories, transposing into the Internet the national monopolies the societies had
traditionally held in the offline world, monopolies that were no longer justified in the digital
environment. For this reason, the Commission preliminarily ruled that the Santiago
Agreements did not meet the conditions required by Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty. While
most performing rights societies strongly opposed the ruling of the Commission, SABAM and
BUMA did not; both agreed that the economic residency requirement infringed the freedom
of movement mandated by the EC Treaty. In letters dated April 20 and May 10, 2005, BUMA
and SABAM respectively declined to be a party to any licensing agreement for online use
containing an economic residence clause129.

The Commission ruling is only a preliminary one and proceedings are still pending.
The investigations have currently been suspended due to the legislative process undertaken by
another institution within the European Union, the Internal Market and Services Directorate
General. While the Directorate General for Competition was investigating the Santiago and
Barcelona Agreements, the Directorate General for Internal Market had indeed initiated a
survey related to copyright management in the European Union130. For the Directorate,
creating a regulatory framework for copyright management was a logical step after achieving
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substantive harmonization through the different directives131. The survey concluded that
abstaining from legislative action was no longer a viable option132. Such was not the opinion
of performing rights societies which, through GESAC, considered the enactment of a
Directive on the collective management of copyright inappropriate133; the societies were of
the opinion that the music industry was undergoing rapid and constant changes, and that it
was up to the market, not to the legislator, to meet the demand for pan-European licenses.
According to the societies, the Santiago and Barcelona Agreements represented a marketbased solution that satisfied all stakeholders.

In spite of these objections, the Directorate for Internal Market commissioned a study
on the benefit of cross-border collective management of copyright that was published on July
7, 2005134. According to the Commission, the gap between 2004 revenues generated by the
online exploitation of music works in the United States and Europe was primarily due to the
structure of collective societies, which limited the scope of licensing by territory135. As we
have seen in Simulcast and in Santiago, improved regulation of copyright management was
motivated by the desire to enhance competition among collective societies. Since the
monopolistic position of these societies was not justified in the digital environment due to the
cross-border trading of musical works, they had to comply with Art. 81-83 EC Treaty and
compete with each other. For the Directorate, recent moves aimed at providing users with
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multi-territorial licensing were insufficient because they did not enable rights holders to
comply with the performing rights society of their choice. The study proposed three options:
(1) do nothing and let the market operate freely; (2) eliminate territorial restrictions and
discriminatory provisions in the reciprocal agreements concluded between the societies; (3)
give rights holders the option to choose the society of their choice to grant online rights for
the entire EU136. The first option was not seriously taken into consideration by the
Commission. The second one would have introduced a single entry point and choice for users,
who could have required a license from any collective society as in the Simulcast Agreement;
however, this would not have increased competition at the level of the rights holders, which
was the ultimate goal of the Commission. The basic difference between the latter options was
indeed that option 3 introduced competition in the relationship between right holders and
collective societies, while option 2 introduced competition at the users’ level137. Obviously,
the study favored the third option, the only one to actually allow competition at the level of
the rights holders by giving them the right to join any society138.

The Commission, obviously keen on going forward with the adoption of a directive,
irritated many by purposefully setting a twenty day deadline in the middle of August to
receive comments. Though this period is particularly inappropriate for public participation
because most Europeans are on vacation, 80 organizations submitted comments. Contrary to
what had been assumed by the Directorate in its study, CISAC pointed out that Article 11 (II)
of its Model Contract, according to which affiliates had to be nationals of the country in
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which their performing rights society operated, had been removed in March 2004139. In other
words, the primary restriction which had justified an initiative towards cross-border
management, i.e., the so-called impossibility for rights holders to join the society of their
choice, simply did not exist. Moreover, the figures demonstrating that revenues generated in
the United States would be eight times higher than in Europe were misleading because they
did not take into account several trends. Revenues generated by ring tones are much higher in
Europe than in the United States, and iTunes had not yet been launched in Europe. As
expected, collective societies rejected both options 2 and 3. Even though option 2, which
favored competition at the users’ level, was built upon the reciprocal agreements that had
been fundamental to collective societies for over 150 years, it enabled users to “forum shop”,
a situation the societies felt was untenable. Besides, it would lead users to seek out the least
demanding society, thus encouraging a “race to the bottom” where collective societies became
less effective because they were cutting costs to be cheaper and thus more attractive to users,
to the detriment of authors140. To favor competition at the rights holders’ level as retained by
option 3 was even more worrying because the study concluded that “With respect to crossborder distribution of offline royalties, we believe that Option 3 will also be the most
sustainable long-term model”141; in other words, in the long term, the model would also be
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extended to the offline exploitation of copyrighted works. The study thus aimed at
revolutionizing the whole model upon which collective societies had been built. GESAC tried
to draw the Commission’s attention to several unanticipated consequences of option 3: first,
large publishers were likely to adhere to foreign collective societies having substantial
financial resources like GEMA or SACEM, while individuals would remain members of their
small or medium size national societies; this situation would lead to considerable difficulties
regarding documentation and distribution of royalties, and thus significantly increase the costs
of management. Second, contrary to the Commission’s prediction, to favor competition at the
rights holders’ level threatened small collective societies and, consequently, cultural
diversity142.

Unfortunately for performing rights societies, the battle was lost almost before it
began. The Commission unsurprisingly considered that favoring competition at the rights
holders’ level was the most promising to enhance competition and satisfy the needs of
stakeholders. However, in a nod to the strong opposition, the Commission turned the foreseen
directive into a Recommendation on September 30, 2005143. The Recommendation’s main
provisions for our purpose are the third and fifth ones:

“3. Right-holders should have the right to entrust the management of any of the online rights necessary
to operate legitimate online music services, on a territorial scope of their choice, to a collective rights
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manager of their choice, irrespective of the Member State of residence or the nationality of either the
collective rights manager or the right-holder.

[…]

5. With respect to the licensing of online rights the relationship between right-holders and collective
rights managers, whether based on contract or statutory membership rules, should at least be governed
by the following: (a) right-holders should be able to determine the online rights to be entrusted for
collective management; (b) right-holders should be able to determine the territorial scope of the
mandate of the collective rights manager; (c) right-holders should, upon reasonable notice of their
intention to do so, have the right to withdraw any of the online rights and transfer the multi territorial
management of those rights to another collective rights manager, irrespective of the Member State of
residence or the nationality of either the collective rights manager or the right-holder; (d) where a rightholder has transferred the management of an online right to another collective rights managers, without
prejudice to other forms of cooperation among rights managers, all collective rights managers
concerned should ensure that those online rights are withdrawn from any existing reciprocal
representation agreement concluded amongst them.”

How did performing rights societies react to the adoption of this recommendation?

2.

Performing Rights Societies’ Concerns

a)

General Remarks

At first glance, the Recommendation may not seem to change much to the current
situation. After all, unlike what the Commission thought, Art. 11 II of the CISAC Model
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Contract no longer existed. Moreover, GEMA had already made it clear in 1971 that rights
holders could join any performing rights society within the Community and were allowed to
allocate their rights to different societies in different territories144. In 1993, U2 had confirmed
that authors had the right to withdraw their affiliation and individually manage their
copyrights145. Yet performing rights societies were worried because the central licensing
agreements encouraged by the Recommendation made much more sense in the online world
than offline, and because it enabled the “central” society to deliver cross-border licenses
without the need to refer to reciprocal agreements, thus threatening the territorial structure
upon which performing rights societies have been built.
During the interviews, European performing rights societies wondered whether crossborder licensing is a model that is responsive to actual needs of users. GEMA and SACEM
explain that “most users are interested in the deliverance of local licenses rather than crossborder ones”. For example, in July 2005, GEMA stated that only two out of 41 ring tone
companies and zero online music store had requested a cross-border license; for instance,
while GEMA offered Apple a license covering Austria, Czech Republic, Germany and
Switzerland, the company, assuming that GEMA would apply its high rate to these countries
as well, refused and sought the cheaper licenses from each country146. While large users like
iTunes may be able to suffer the necessary transaction costs to negotiate with each collective
society, most small players will not. Interestingly, SUISA points out that “cross-border
licenses might paradoxically favor small users who are financially unable to seek licenses
from different performing rights societies”. Another hindrance to the development of cross144
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border licenses might be the language of users’ websites; for instance, JASRAC explains that,
in general, its users provide services to the Japanese public in Japanese, so that there is no real
practical need for cross-border licenses.
In spite of these observations, cross-border licenses can be expected to gain traction
over years as proved by the central licensing agreement that was announced during the annual
session of MIDEM in Cannes on January 23, 2006 by GEMA and PRS/MCPS, according to
which EMI Music Publishing had decided to work with them to build a one-stop shop to clear
the rights of EMI’s Anglo-American songs across Europe for online and mobile usage147. The
possibility for European performing rights societies to conclude central licensing agreements
with right holders and, as a result, to deliver cross-border licenses to users raises concerns of
both small, medium and large performing rights societies:

b)

Small performing rights societies concerns

Whether large or small, the performing rights societies interviewed agree that, by
encouraging central licensing agreements, the Recommendation endangers the role of
reciprocal agreements and, consequently, threatens the existence of numerous small and
medium performing rights societies. As stated by SABAM, “major publishers now have a
clear interest in reducing transaction costs by assigning all their rights to large performing
rights societies such as GEMA, PRS or SACEM and closing the local offices of their subpublishers”. The disappearance of local sub-publishers, better informed about local needs,
may ultimately impoverish cultural diversity, a result that conflicts with the recent signature
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by performing rights societies of the UNESCO Convention, whose main purpose is to
recognize and celebrate the importance of cultural diversity148. The utilitarian approach taken
by the European Commission would thus be unable to properly consider the multiple
functions performed by the societies, in particular their cultural and social roles.
SUISA, another small performing right society, obviously shares SABAM’s concerns,
with one major difference: unlike SABAM, SUISA does not believe that individual authors
would be influenced by the majors to join large performing rights societies. The Swiss
performing right society believes that proximity matters for individuals, a feeling also shared
by SACEM. The rights of authors to assign their rights to any society since GEMA was never
really used; according to SUISA, “in practice, it is important for individuals to be in direct
contact with their local society, with whom they share a common language and have
developed trust”. For the Swiss performing rights society, the recommendation may lead to
the development of a dual system: one for the majors, whose rights would be assigned to large
performing rights societies, and one for individuals, who would remain affiliated to their local
society. As a result, small performing rights societies would be unable to offer the majors’
repertoires and would be limited to the management of only their members’ works, a far less
attractive and lucrative situation for users. Deprived of their primary source of revenue, small
and medium size societies may no longer be viable.
GEMA, which has also opposed option 3, concedes that this risk may exist. However,
at this stage, “any such assertions would be merely speculative”. For GEMA, “cultural
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diversity has already disappeared to a great extent without any centralization; such is the case
in particular with radio stations, which do not offer a wide repertoire, instead performing the
same hits days and nights”.
In its impact assessment report published on October 10, 2005, the Commission
sweeps these fears aside and states that, to the contrary, the retained option will allow all
societies to compete for members irrespective of their nationality or domicile. Therefore, a
performing rights society which does not have a strong repertoire may attract rights holders
from other jurisdictions based on its efficiency149. One cannot deny this possibility, as the
central licensing agreement concluded on April 30, 2004 between SABAM and Universal for
eighteen months proves150. However, the parallel drawn by the Commission between costs
and efficiency is strongly criticized by all performing rights societies interviewed, which
unanimously agree that their efficiency cannot be mirrored by their costs. It depends on what
services societies perform for those costs, and their effectiveness in performing those services.
Far from being a sign of efficiency, administration costs significantly lower than the one
charged by sister societies are likely to reflect less valuable management to the detriment of
the rights holders151. GEMA in particular insists on pointing out that “monitoring copyrighted
works, auditing users, compiling necessary documentation, drafting detailed reports and
setting up DRM are expensive, much more so than the European Commission seems to
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believe”. One cannot logically require collective societies to produce a complete census and
simultaneously reduce their administration costs, as the European Commission does.
Small and medium size performing rights societies know that they will not be able to
afford the costly infrastructure described above if they are forced to compete without the
majors’ repertoires. If central licensing agreements develop as can be expected, small and
medium performing rights societies are likely to have no choice but to reduce their costs to
survive. Questioned as to possible solutions to reduce their costs of management, GEMA and
SABAM consider that small societies will have to combine their resources and create joint
ventures to consolidate technical investments and back office administration. Joint ventures
have already been created among collective societies, both at the national and international
level: for example, PRS/MCPS, SACEM/SDRM and BUMA/STEMRA share certain
elements of management regarding the common exploitation of performing and mechanical
rights152. On the international scene, several cooperative agreements have been signed:
between SABAM and BUMA/STEMRA regarding the joint management of mechanical
rights and IT support, data synchronization and process harmonization153, in the Carribean
region154 and the International Music Joint Venture (IMJV) put in place by PRS/MCPS,
BUMA/STEMRA, ASCAP and SOCAN to use a single shared database155.

c)

Large (potentially central) performing rights societies’ concerns
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While the situation is particularly worrying for small performing rights societies,
larger ones also expressed some concerns during the interviews. GEMA believes that
“delivering cross-border licenses is one thing, but monitoring the exploitation of works
performed in other countries is entirely different”. The European Competition is wrong in its
belief that DRM are a solution to every problem. Several management steps still must be
performed offline: how can one society granting a cross-border license confirm that
documentation provided by users accurately reflects the exploitation that took place? Auditing
will obviously be required. Who will be entrusted to audit the accounting of users located in
other countries and speaking different languages? For GEMA, the “central” society “must
have access to users’ location to check the configuration of their IT support and DRM to
determine whether reports accurately reflect the consumption of musical works.
Circumvention by users who would put in place their own infrastructure is very easy and, in
most cases, access to users’ software is impossible”. GEMA concedes that it already faces
difficulties getting reports from German ring tone companies156, and wonders how to
effectively safeguard its members’ interests at the international level. If users refuse to pay
their royalties, how could enforcement be achieved? Would the granting society have
standing in other countries to sue the users? These are serious practical hindrances against an
effective cross-bordermanagement
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. Strangely enough, at a time when competition between

performing rights societies has significantly increased, the need for cooperation and
information sharing has never been so urgent.
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Finally, SUISA draws our attention to the fact that the delivery of central licensing
agreements will raise concern regarding the scope of the rights covered by these agreements:
“In practice, one author may already have assigned its rights to a society before contracting
with a publisher. In this case, the agreement between the author and publisher can obviously
not cover the rights which have already been assigned to a performing rights society. In the
traditional license model, the issue to know whether the rights upon a certain work are
managed by the performing rights society of the author or the one of the publisher does not
matter, since each performing rights society monitors a worldwide repertoire on its own
territory based upon reciprocal agreements. The situation gets different in the case of central
licensing agreements, where the “central” performing rights society will have to find whether
all the works of a given author are covered by the central licensing agreement or not, since it
will only be entitled to deliver cross-border licenses for the works covered by the agreement”.
According to SUISA, this delimitation didn’t need to be made previously and will involve
significant transaction costs, thus creating a serious practical hindrance.

d)

Towards a New Environment

All in all, performing rights societies agree that the adoption of the EU
Recommendation changes the atmosphere and has an impact upon their prior solidarity.
Competition increases at several levels: performing rights societies do not only have to
compete against each other, with the large and small societies seeking different goals, but also
have to confront the major publishers. While DRM may serve the interests of collective
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societies and help solve the problems described above as well as enhance cooperation158, they
can also be implemented by the rights holders themselves. Should DRM be regarded as a step
towards individual management, and consequently the demise of collective management?

3.

Digital Rights Management (DRM): a Friendly Enemy?

According to Professor Hugenholtz, “Copyright levy systems have been premised on
the assumption that private copying of protected works cannot be controlled and exploited
individually. With the advent of DRM, this assumption must be re-examined. In the digital
environment, technical protection measures and digital rights managements systems make it
increasingly possible to control how individuals use copyrighted works”159. Therefore, the
possibilities conferred to rights holders to directly control the exploitation of their works
through DRM should enable them to fully exercise their exclusive rights. Thanks to DRM, the
implementation of exceptions (such as private use) and levies on blankets or devices that go
with them could be phased out. Rights holders would thus be in a position to get better
compensation than they used to get through the levies distributed by collective societies.
Individual management could thus replace collective management.
Questioned about Hugenholtz’ position and the possible implementation of DRM as a
substitute to collective management, performing rights societies share the same viewpoint;
whether European, American or Japanese, they strongly reject Hugenholtz’ assertions, for
several reasons. First, individual management is extremely costly and even prohibitive for a
158
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vast majority of authors. Second, to monitor the exploitation of the works requires an
expertise that rights holders do not have. Third, European performing rights societies in
particular believe they play an important social role. They represent a lobbying force to
negotiate against powerful users with far more leverage than the authors alone160. Without
performing rights societies, authors would be at the mercy of users and producers.
If individuals do not have the financial resources and expertise to manage the
exploitation of their works, one may wonder why the major publishers could not withdraw
their repertoire from these societies, self-monitor the exploitation of their repertoire and
thereby increase their profit margins. Among the societies interviewed, only SUISA concedes
that this possibility raises serious long term concerns. ASCAP however wonders “Why a
publisher would feel like engaging the costs of direct licensing when there is an amazingly
effective system [i.e. collective management] at disposal? Far from increasing their profit
margin, publishers might lose money”161.
Performing rights societies have suggested two factors that may indeed prevent
publishers from engaging in individual management, at least on a short-term basis:
First, users do not want to acquire several licenses from different entities; they want to
exploit a worldwide repertoire with only a single license. Performing rights societies are still
the only entities to provide such a service. While it is true that the majors may agree among
themselves to offer a similar service in the future, such agreements would suffer two
160
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shortcomings: they would most likely be considered a concerted practice that would fall under
the scrutiny of competition authorities due to the dominant position of the majors162, and
would probably lead to an increase in the amount of royalties sought, thus encouraging
opposition from users. Regardless, this first argument seems pretty weak. The United States
example clearly demonstrates that the need to acquire a reasonable number of licenses is not a
serious hindrance for users; the situation of iTunes, which preferred to acquire several
licenses rather than to accept the single one proposed by GEMA for Austria, Germany and
Switzerland is another example. Truth remains that users have a similar interest as rights
holders to the existence of performing rights societies.
A second argument is more decisive. All performing rights societies agree that there is
no uniform standard for DRM so far, and that companies are unlikely to reach an agreement.
At this stage, the establishment of a global and interoperable technical infrastructure on DRM
systems based on a consensus among the stakeholders is far from being achieved163. A study
published in July 2004 by the High Level Group on Digital Rights Management, a study
group created by the European Commission, states that “the timescale to see meaningful
progress towards mass-market deployment of interoperable solutions would likely be in the
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range of two to five years”164. In addition to what precedes, GESAC adds that “DRM are not
by themselves a satisfactory solution to the needs of protection of authors in term of control of
the exploitation of their works, court proceedings, fight against piracy, negotiation of fair
terms of remuneration with users etc…”165. According to GESAC, for the time being no user
suggests that DRM could effectively replace authors’ societies in rights management166.
Universal even shares this opinion, believing that “collective licensing may well have a future
and certainly is a viable business model for licensing in the context of on-line delivery
mechanisms. In fact it may be the only viable method of licensing. It remains to be seen
whether the existing copyright societies can reform themselves sufficiently to be able to
deliver collective licensing in this context, or whether the members should seek alternative
collective solutions”167. For these reasons, performing rights societies firmly believe the
solutions offered by scholars, according to which levy schemes could be abandoned thanks to
DRM and possibilities of individual management168, are totally unrealistic.
Performing rights societies are nevertheless deeply aware that their business model,
based upon 19th century needs, has to be adapted to the needs of the digital environment.
Performing rights societies view DRM not as a competitor but as “a helpful tool that
164
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facilitates the identification and accurate tracking of the use of works”169. They are already
used to a great extent in the United States: in August 2005, BMI acquired a digital audio
recognition technology called BlueArrow, which enables BMI to accurately measure the
performance of music on radio, television and the Internet170; and ASCAP uses Mediaguide, a
digital verification device to track the use of various music by US radio stations171. ASCAP
claims that, thanks to these technological tools, the sample gets closer to a complete census.
However, the use of DRM is not limited to tracking the exploitation of music works on radio
stations or television channels. In November 2005, BUMA/STEMRA announced that they
had reached an agreement with the Dance Music Interest Association to digitally monitor the
exploitation of works during live events172. International initiatives also exist. One of the most
ambitious projects to respond to the challenges of digital technology is the CISAC’s Common
Information System (CIS), whose goal is to create a database that would be accessible to any
performing right society. This database would enable societies to track music works using
only a single identification number in any area of the world173.
In conclusion, stakeholders agree that DRM are unlikely to replace performing rights
societies. Far from being viewed as a competitor, the societies believe that DRM will help
them to adapt their structure to this new environment. Technological tools will enable them to
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operate with more efficiency by enhancing cooperation and transparency through the creation
of common standards and IT support in particular.

4.

Current Practice of Performing Rights Societies174

a)

Introduction

BMI and ASCAP started to license online exploitation of musical works in 1995.
Today, all performing rights societies interviewed deliver online licenses. Until December 31,
2004, European performing rights societies and BMI were applying the Santiago Agreement
and thus delivering pan-European licenses to users who had their economical residence in
their territory. Considering the Statement of Objections delivered in April 2004 by the
European Competition Commission, the societies decided not to renew the Agreement after
its initial term set on December 31, 2004.
Since January 1, 2005, European performing rights societies have returned to the
traditional single license model, which is also used by the United States and Japan. With a
single territorial license model, performing rights societies deliver blanket licenses covering a
worldwide repertoire, but limited to the territories of their competence175. Theoretically,
performing rights societies could also deliver worldwide licenses for their own local
members’ works; however, a dual system that would establish cross-border licenses for the
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local repertoire and licenses limited to their territory for the repertoires of their sister societies
would be too cumbersome to monitor, without mentioning the difficulties to identify one’s
own repertoire.

b)

The granting of territorial licenses in the absence of central licensing agreements

In the absence of central licensing agreements, performing rights societies thus grant
licenses limited to their own territory. As a consequence, it is important to understand the
criteria referred to by these societies to define their competence. Interviews demonstrate a
lack of uniformity so that the criterion will differ from one society to another: the first, used
by JASRAC and SABAM, considers the residence of users as decisive. In other words, a user
located in Japan or Belgium will have to ask for a license from JASRAC or SABAM, even
though the services would not be provided to the Japanese or Belgium public. The location of
the server is not considered relevant, because of the “forum-shopping” it would encourage in
users. A second point of attachment relates to the origin of the transmission; this criterion is
used by ASCAP which, according to article 6 lit. c of its experimental license agreement for
Internet sites176, is competent to grant a license to any user whose signal originates from the
United States or its possessions. In other words, ASCAP is “not competent to deliver a license
to a US company whose signal is transmitted from its facilities in the United Kingdom”.
Under the third criterion, the point of destination (end-user principle) is decisive. This
viewpoint has been adopted by SACEM, which considers its competence justified each time a
user provides its services to the French public. SABAM also attaches importance to the
176
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market as an alternative to the residence of users, since it considers the existence of a domain
name registered under the “.be” ccTLD as relevant to define its competence. Finally, BMI
and SUISA consider both the points of origin and of destination to be relevant criteria, since
both constitute points of attachment to their territories.

Example:
A French company originates its transmission from Belgium to provide its services to the US and Swiss
markets. The French company will neither have to ask for a license from SACEM, since the services are
not offered to the French public, nor to ASCAP, since the transmission does not originate from the US.
While the transmission originates from Belgium, SABAM does not consider the point of origin to be a
relevant criterion, so that the French company does not need the deliverance of a license from SABAM
either. Considering the fact that it offers its services to the US and Swiss markets, the French company
will have to acquire a license from BMI and SUISA, because both these societies consider the point of
destination to be a relevant criterion to define their competence.

While practice shows that users assume the point of destination to be the relevant
criterion and thus acquire a license in each country where they intend to provide their
services, the application review process is far from harmonious. The relevant criteria can vary
with each society and with each country. Such a solution may lead to disputes: for instance, a
Belgium company that would originate its transmission from the United States for the French
market should not only acquire a license from SACEM (point of destination), but from
SABAM (economic residence) and ASCAP (point of origin) as well. There is no doubt that a
common standard would be highly desirable to achieve legal certainty. According to
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SABAM, discussions would be taking place among performing rights societies on these
points since the adoption of the EU Recommendation.

c)

The applicable rate schedule(s) in case of a central licensing agreement

When rights holders sign a central licensing agreement with a performing rights
society to assign all their rights on a worldwide basis, the society will have the ability to offer
cross-border licenses to users. Since the works will be exploited in different countries,
presumably with different cost structures, one may wonder whose rate schedule will apply.
Does the granting society apply its rate schedule, no matter where the exploitation takes place,
or will it apply the rate schedule used by the relevant society in each country where the works
are exploited? Performing rights societies dealing with offline central licensing agreements
have always applied the second alternative, in compliance with the principle of the country of
destination. In the first online central licensing agreement ever concluded between Universal
and SABAM, the latter however unilaterally decided to apply its own rate schedule for all
performances, without the prior consent of its sister societies177. Performing rights societies
strongly reacted to what was considered a violation of the principle of the country of
destination. While SABAM points out that the licensing agreement never gave rise to any
concern from competition authorities and was perfectly valid178, it did defer to the strong
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reaction of its sister societies and now recognizes that “negotiations among collective
societies are always needed to conclude cross-border licenses”. Several proposed cross-border
licenses have already been negotiated and finalized: iTunes got a license from SACEM
covering not only France, Luxembourg and Monaco, but also Belgium; telecommunication
companies such as Nokia and Ericson also received cross-border licenses from the performing
rights society of their respective countries for mobile phone use of the world music repertoire.
The country of destination is a key consideration for performing rights societies,
whose primary goal is to protect their own members. Accordingly, they assert that their rate
schedule will have to apply to every exploitation that takes place in their country. Technically,
the geographical scope of a cross-border license may cover the entire European Union, but the
granting society will thus have no choice but to apply 25 different rate schedules to take into
account the geographical exploitation of the works.

To avoid the application of several rate schedules by the granting society, European
performing rights societies would favor the adoption of a pan-European rate schedule. Such a
solution is at least several years in the future according to GEMA and SACEM, which still
consider the online distribution of music works to be at its infancy. Due to the differential
penetration of online music distribution in various countries, these societies believe a
centralized rate structure is premature. The French society adds that collective societies take
several factors into consideration each time they adopt a rate schedule179, including social and
economical conditions and previous existing rate schedules. Though each country is different,

of sister societies infringes the principle of territoriality, according to which one should refer to the applicable
regulations of the concerned country for any act occurring in this country.
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SUISA hopes that harmonization among countries with similar socio-economical conditions
is nevertheless possible. The European Competition Commission would most likely favor the
adoption of a common rate schedule as proved by Simulcast, where the rate schedule was an
aggregate of the rates applicable in the different countries, provided however that the rate
clearly makes a distinction between the royalty and the commission so as to enhance
competition180.
In practice, the current diversity among applicable rate schedules is not a significant
hindrance. Since Lucazeau, the imposition of significantly higher tariffs than those applicable
in other European Member States constitutes an abuse of dominant position, unless the
differences are justified by objective and relevant factors181. As a result, the applicable rates
as to the online exploitation of copyrighted works are very similar in the European Union:
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The applicable rates among European performing rights societies are thus nearly
identical190, with the notable exception of Germany. Questioned as to the rationale for this
difference, GEMA answers that “current rates are far too low and no longer reflect the value
of the rights holders’ contributions”. According to the German society, “labels get up to 70%
of the revenues generated, causing unreasonable financial loss for artists; a rate of
approximately 20% would be the ideal”. SUISA agrees that current rates do not reflect market
realities in music distribution where music prices are getting cheaper each year thanks to
technological innovations. Article 60 of the Swiss Copyright however mandates that the
royalty should not exceed 10% except under exceptional circumstances. An amendment may
therefore be necessary to raise rates to appropriate levels. SACEM ambitiously intends to
increase its rate to 12% over the next years, a policy that GEMA and SABAM deem
unrealistic given the historical difficulties in raising rates once they are set.
The rates of European performing rights societies nevertheless show slight
differences. For instance, SUISA and GEMA are the only European societies that consider the
length of the music downloaded191. Unlike SACEM, which requires an additional royalty of
100€ per month if pre-listening is possible, SABAM does not require any additional royalty
for pre-listening. On the other hand, GEMA has a special rate schedule for pre-listening, i.e.,
the streaming of works up to 45 seconds for sampling purposes192. All these differences are
considered as minor by SACEM, according to whom “the management of cross-border
licenses should not lead to a significant cost increase”.
Differences in the rest of the world are more significant than in Europe. To compare
the situation among these performing rights societies, the table only refers to blanket usage
license agreements delivered for commercial purposes. Rates are however structured

60

differently from one continent to another. In Japan, JASRAC has a particularly detailed rate
schedule regarding interactive transmissions and distinguishes whether the license agreement
is a blanket one or not, whether the service is commercial in nature or not and the type of
works downloaded (sound recordings or lyrics or other). The Japanese rate schedules were
negotiated between the Japanese collective society and a trade organization representing
online music service operators, Network Music Rights Conference (NMRC). According to
JASRAC, the existence of NMRC as a representative entity leads the prosperity of the
Japanese market for online distribution of music. In the United States, ASCAP and BMI both
refer to sampling methods that not only take into account the number of works consumed, but
also other factors such as the revenues generated through advertising193.
Since performing rights societies have to comply with the principle of fair and
equitable treatment, identical rate schedules have to apply to all users conducting similar
activities on the same market. The societies thus strongly affirm that users cannot re-negotiate
the royalty rate, unless they can demonstrate that their business model differs from existing
ones in a way that justifies differential rates. According to SACEM, “users often try to make
such a demonstration, for instance by stating that their online store differs from iTunes
because they cannot rely upon revenues generated by the sales of iPods”. Unfortunately for
them, this argument has been rejected by SACEM since “iPods and iTunes are legally distinct
from each other”. The definition of the relevant market nevertheless remains a key issue to
avoid any problem with competition authorities. Separate rate schedules are thus adopted
every now and then when a new business model appears. While the table only mentions the
most lucrative ones, performing rights societies have adopted the following rate schedules to
reflect the different types of online exploitations of musical works: background music on
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websites (GEMA, SABAM and SACEM), webcasting (all performing rights societies), video
on demand (GEMA), podcasting (BMI) and online karaoke for commercial uses (JASRAC).
While the royalty rate of the license agreements are hardly negotiable, SABAM believes that
“one could possibly negotiate a discount on the administrative costs, for instance if users
demonstrate that their revenues exceed a certain amount, or if users provide perfect sales
reports, which is far from being the case today and leads to an increase of costs of
management”.

d)

The distribution of the royalties in case of a central licensing agreement

Once performing rights societies have applied a rate schedule and collected the
royalties in compliance with the principle of the country of destination, they will have to
distribute the money among the different rights holders. There are two general alternatives for
this process: either to apply the distribution rules of each country of destination and distribute
the royalties to the different rights holders, or to allocate the money due to its sister societies
in the concerned countries, which would then take care of the distribution in compliance with
their respective distribution rules. The first alternative is considered too expensive by all
performing rights societies and would ultimately lead to a significant increase of the costs of
management and, consequently, to lower royalty rates to the prejudice of the rights holders.
For this reason, the second alternative is the only one applied, both for offline and online
central licensing agreements. Traditional distribution rules remain applicable since no
performing right society has adopted specific rules for the online exploitation of musical
works.
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The society to which rights holders have assigned all their rights through a central
licensing agreement will thus allocate the amount due for each country of destination based
on its own valuation. Therefore, performing rights societies will depend upon the “central”
society for their share of royalties. In spite of a growing competitive environment,
cooperation and transparency thus become particularly important. GEMA made it clear that
its cross-border licenses would have several requirements: “first, users must secure the rights
to obtain a multi-territorial license (for example the adaptation rights for ring tone
companies); second, the agreement itself will be subject to strict conditions regarding respect
of moral rights, reporting and management infrastructure”. Cooperation among performing
rights societies will be important with the development in online music stores, which makes it
difficult for societies to audit the accuracy and relevance of sales reports. While one can
easily appraise the valuation made by a sister society regarding the number of audience
members in a movie theater, SUISA concedes that “a lack of technical expertise makes it
difficult to accurately monitor the number of downloads reported”. This lack of
sophistication194 may result in different claims from performing rights societies against their
sister societies and protests from users. To resolve disputes related to royalties, GEMA has
established an arbitration system195 whereby it opens an escrow account with the concerned
user. The amount in dispute is placed in the escrow account, and the rest directly paid to
GEMA. In this way, “the user only pays the amount that it considers fair, and the rest is put in
the escrow account”. After the settlement, the effects of the decision are retroactive and the
money on the escrow account is distributed in compliance with the decision. According to
GEMA, “this could be a problem for users like Napster, which contests a substantial amount
of royalties due, and would thus have to pay a large amount in to the escrow account”.
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While the design of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (ADR) will be needed
to solve cross-border disputes related to the central management of musical works196, ADR
will not get rid of the necessity to enhance transparency and cooperation among societies.
Standards, database and form requirements will have to be standardized; at a time of
centralization, it makes no sense for users to have to complete form reports structured
differently for each country. Cooperation through the creation and exploitation of common
database such as the CIS project is thus crucial to register and keep track of performances, as
well as to avoid duplication on the documentation side to improve efficiency and users’
convenience197.

B.

Unauthorized Distribution Channels: Enforcement and P2P

The unauthorized distribution of musical works takes place in two ways: through
unauthorized streaming or downloading websites or through p2p file exchange systems. How
do performing rights societies approach these channels? How can they improve their
monitoring systems?

1.

Enforcement mechanisms

All performing rights societies interviewed actively prevent the proliferation of illegal
websites by monitoring the web. GEMA’ surveillance system relies not only on its own staff,
but also on third parties and lawyers to police the web. SABAM also proactively contacts ring
tone companies to grant licenses for Belgium. At this stage, revenues generated by online
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music stores however remain limited198 and do not allow a systematic intervention of
performing rights societies which focus their efforts on important websites.
Once a website allowing unauthorized performances of musical works is discovered,
performing rights societies will contact the owner and invite him to request a license. In most
cases, owners agree. In the few cases where the owners refuse, the societies will request the
intervention of Internet service providers (ISPs). The ISPs have to react diligently in
compliance with articles 12-14 of the E-Commerce Directive if they don’t want to be held
liable for infringement occurring on these websites199. The cooperation of ISPs has even been
made official in France through the signature in July 2004 of a Charter against piracy200. This
Charter can be invoked not only to secure the intervention of ISPs against websites’ owners,
but also against ISPs themselves. It has already been used by SACEM “to oblige access
providers like Tiscali and Wanadoo to enjoin their advertising campaigns promoting their
broadband capacities to enable fast downloading of musical works”. On the whole,
cooperation with ISPs is considered effective by European performing rights societies and
proves to be an efficient way to legalize the situations. Once an ISP threatens a website owner
with a shut down of his service, the latter will almost always ask for a license. While this
cooperation seems to be effective in Japan, ASCAP and BMI remain disappointed with the
US situation and believe that the safe harbor provisions in section 512 of the DMCA are to
blame. Though these provisions were supported by these societies at the time of their
enactment, ASCAP and BMI now believe that “they were not the best way to handle the
problem”.
While effective, cooperation between ISPs and European performing rights societies is
more difficult in two situations. First, when the website is hosted abroad, pressure exercised
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by performing rights societies cannot be as strong as within their territory. In this case, one
can expect performing rights societies to cooperate to handle these cases within their
respective territory. Second, ISPs are reluctant to intervene when the unauthorized
distribution of music occurs through chats, discussions forums or p2p, since they do not
consider themselves liable for traffic generated by consumers. This scenario led to a lawsuit
brought by SABAM against Tiscali, an access service provider, in the Tribunal de première
instance de Bruxelles on June 24, 2004201. SABAM would like a ruling that would require
ISPs to filter musical works and prevent their transmissions through these websites. On
November 26, 2004, the Court invited experts to determine whether the technical solutions
proposed were feasible. While the Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles seems to be
responsive to the arguments raised by SABAM, the case is still pending. Similarly, in July
2005, GEMA requested that 42 access providers take steps to block access to certain illegal
websites that enable copyright infringement202; negotiations are ongoing.

2.

p2p file exchange systems

The development of authorized platforms like iTunes and lawsuits against consumers
has led to a decrease of p2p systems usage203, but the exchange of musical files will continue
through new means of distributions such as instant messengers or reader devices204.
Performing rights societies are deeply concerned by this situation but none of them is yet able
to suggest a miracle way to solve the problem.
Whether American, European or Japanese, performing rights societies all consider the
actions brought by the RIAA against individuals to be detrimental to public relations. While
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consumers are without doubt liable for uploading and thus enabling an unauthorized
distribution of works205, ASCAP considers it more effective to sue providers which actually
derive benefit from the situation. By analogy, ASCAP states that “one will neither sue a band
that performs music in a pub without required authorization nor consumers, but the owner
who ultimately profits from this situation”206. The same should apply on the Internet. ASCAP
and GEMA nevertheless understand that “the RIAA currently has no alternative to protect its
members’ interests”. From its perspective, SABAM considers these actions to be mostly
ineffective, which explains its choice to sue an access provider like Tiscali rather than
consumers. The goal is however not to shut down the websites - the more people consume
works, the better it is – but to get fair remuneration for the authors. BMI believes that, if one
admits that most downloaders are students, “the best way to handle the problem may be to
launch educational campaigns in schools”.
Performing rights societies feel that only the introduction of a compulsory license can
improve the situation. Most societies agree that there is a danger of turning exclusive rights
into remuneration rights, and thereby transforming the right to exclude in a mere right to get
paid. Some feel that this may lead consumers to believe that they can exchange musical files
“for free”, but it is the lesser of two evils; they find it hard to imagine any other way to
receive fair remuneration for their members.
Such a levy already exists in one form or another in some countries. While Japan has
refused to introduce a rate schedule applicable to reader devices such as MP3 players or
iPods, Germany and Switzerland already have one. For SUISA, such levy schemes for reader
devices are all the more important in the digital age because new business models allow the
consumption of music for a cheaper price, provided that consumers purchase expensive

67

readers to play the works. They are by far the primary source of revenues, and rights holders
have no reason to be deprived of revenues made possible thanks to their creations.
While compulsory licenses upon blanket media and reader devices are already
disputed in most countries, things get even worse when one proposes a compulsory license for
ISPs. GEMA believes that “telecommunication operators should pay royalties for the
transmission of musical works they facilitate”; according to the German society, “it is time for
Governments and European authorities to understand that these operators make a lot of
money through the distribution of illegal content, to the detriment of the rights holders, and
that they should pay for it”. The French Legislature first seemed to agree; in December 2005,
the National Assembly proposed a bill that would have compelled ISPs to pay a flat royalty
rate through their subscription fees, and create a global license upon exchange files systems in
return. Unlike GEMA, SACEM opposed such a scheme, asserting that a global license would
not have reflected the actual consumption of each work – which is made possible to a certain
extent by other compulsory licenses such as the one upon the sales of blank media for
instance - and would ultimately have been detrimental to the rights holders. On March 9,
2006, the French Parliament finally rejected the proposal for a global license and decided to
encourage the development of DRM by keeping the proprietary model as the default
regime207.

While the introduction of new levy schemes such as those imagined by GEMA, the
French National Assembly or various scholars208 might be the only way for authors to receive
fair remuneration for the exploitation of their works through file exchange systems at this
stage209, compliance with the three steps test enacted in Art. 9.2 of the Berne Convention and
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10.1 of the TRIPS Agreement is highly doubtful. As stated by Peukert210, these treaties
mandate exclusive rights and anti-circumvention provisions as the statutory default regime in
national copyright laws. In other words, one could only give rights holders the choice to
voluntarily opt for compensation instead of control. To that extent, the solution finally
retained by the French Parliament to let the rights holders freely choose their mode of
remuneration fully complies with a voluntary system211.
In any case, without broaching the subject of new levy systems, existing schemes
already face strong opposition from the software industry as well as manufacturers of
recording devices and blank media. These industries’ representatives allege that private
copying schemes could now be phased out in favor of DRM. Several countries seem to be
responsive to these assertions. The European Commission recently began an investigation into
the need to adapt the private copy remuneration schemes which exist in 22 out of the 25
Member States; these schemes would also be under review in other countries such as
Australia, Canada, Japan and Mexico212. However, as previously discussed, DRM are still in
their infancy and unable to efficiently protect rights holders; collective societies, CISAC,
BIEM and GESAC in particular, constantly affirm that the abolition of these schemes would
be detrimental to the rights holders and to creation of works in general213.
Based upon what precedes, one cannot expect a global consensus to emerge to solve
the problems created by exchange file systems at the international level in the next months.
This being said, p2p seem to raise more concern for the entertainment industry than for
authors themselves. Thus, according to a Pew Report published in December 2004, artists are
divided about file sharing; while a majority believes that unauthorized file sharing of
copyrighted works should be illegal, most authors use the internet to gain inspiration and do
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not consider file exchange systems to be a big threat to creative industries214. Whatever the
solution, collective management is likely to go on playing a significant role. As stated by
Ficsor, “collective management or some other system of joint exercise of rights, however, is
also needed in the majority of cases where mere rights to remuneration are recognized,
namely, in those cases where mass uses are involved or where it is otherwise particularly
difficult to monitor uses”215. Exchange files systems are a typical example of mass use where
one finds it hard to imagine that the mere implementation of – possibly – effective DRM in
the future would be able to solve every problem and allow complete individual management.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Collective management plays an important role when high transaction cost prevents
individual management. The field of musical works is a typical example of mass use where
rights holders are financially unable to monitor the exploitation of their works. As stated by
Sinacore-Guinn, “The very fact that collective administration of copyright has become
standard practice in all developed countries and the vast majority of developing countries
which have copyright or related rights is in itself evidence that such a method of organization
serves society well”216. Performing rights societies indeed provide useful services to all
stakeholders: to authors, by monitoring the exploitation of their works and bargaining on their
behalf against powerful users or publishers; to publishers, by providing them efficient
services to monitor the exploitation of their repertoire against moderate fees; to users, by
enabling them to acquire a single license per territory thanks to reciprocal agreements
concluded among collective societies (single territorial license model); finally, to society in
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general, by keeping track of all musical works created so far and encouraging musical
diversity thanks to their welfare plans and social actions.
The digital age is unlikely to change that premise. While some argue that DRM would
now enable individual management, performing rights societies consider this assumption to
be short-sighted. DRM are expensive to put in place and individuals cannot afford them. Even
though the major publishers may have the financial resources to install such monitoring
systems, three reasons make individual management unlikely to happen: first, DRM remain
ineffective and lack the interoperability that would be necessary to allow efficient individual
management; second, publishers lack technical expertise: to have a piano is one thing, to
master it is another one; finally, they have no interests to get rid of a system which proved its
efficiency over the years and which provide them with services for a price possibly cheaper
than the costs they would have to incur if they were to put monitoring systems in place.

Although the Internet does not yet represent a major source of income in the music
distribution process, performing rights societies agree that its potential to surpass the
traditional methods of music delivery over the next decades makes a focus on this area
imperative. The assumption according to which the development of online music stores will
likely lead to a substantial increase of the royalties collected on the Internet was confirmed on
March 13, 2006, when ASCAP announced that revenues generated by online music stores in
2005 had increased by 50% in comparison with 2004, for a total amount of USD 8.1
million217. Societies thus recognize that they have to adapt to the digital environment. This
adaptation takes place at several levels:
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First, societies have to respond to new business models that emerge and react
accordingly to ensure fair remuneration to their members. While societies had no difficulty in
enacting new rate schedules for online music stores, webcasting or ring tone companies,
exchange file systems remain an issue of serious concern. As shown in part III, when new
modes of exploitation develop, users’ groups usually first try to argue that the new use should
not be protected and, if that argument fails, then argue that these modes should be made
subject to nonvoluntary licensing schemes. History however proves that, to implement these
remuneration rights, individual management must not only be impractical, but even
impossible; we saw in part III that the issue of compulsory licenses is directly related to the
one of private copying, and that these schemes were in particular enacted to respond to the
development of blank media and reader devices to copy and perform musical works in private
homes. Unsurprisingly, discussions thus turn around the issue to know whether exchange file
systems like p2p should be submitted to compulsory licenses. Unlike the situation with blank
media or reader devices, individual management with these systems however does not appear
impossible (thanks to the possible implementation of DRM), but merely unpractical. The
three steps test encompassed in article 9.2 of the Berne Convention and 10.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement, as well as cases described in part II like GEMA, BRT v. SABAM, U2 or
Banghalter make it clear that the proprietary regime and individual management through
exclusive rights has to remain the default one, and that compulsory license schemes related to
exchange files systems would have to remain voluntary.
Second, to increase their efficiency and confront the “fragmentation” described by
Gervais as “the lack of cohesion, standardization, and, to a certain extent, effective
organization of both copyright law and collective management per se”218, performing rights
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societies need to set up common IT infrastructure and database such as the CIS project under
development. In the online world, territorial borders have no role to play; technical
infrastructure and documentation thus need to be standardized at regional levels if not
worldwide on the long term. Standardization is also needed as to form reports, which remain
different in each country and unnecessarily lead to an increase of transaction costs for users.
Cooperation and transparency will be key factors in this new environment for performing
rights societies to reduce their costs of management and continue to provide costly efficient
services to all stakeholders. “Collective” administration may thus lean towards “cooperative”
and “centralized” administration in the future.
Third, in spite of this necessity for cooperation, European performing rights societies
will have to evolve in a competitive environment for the first time. The monopoly of these
societies is justified regarding the offline exploitation of musical works where performances
occur on a territorial basis. The existence of a single performing rights society per country
thus makes sense to reduce transaction costs. However, considering the ubiquitous nature of
the Internet, these monopolies are no longer justified when performances occur online. To
force performing rights societies to compete against each other, the European Commission
adopted a Recommendation in September 2005 that enables rights holders to assign all their
rights for Europe to a single society (central licensing agreement). This society is then entitled
to grant cross-border licenses to any user, thus erasing the need to maintain reciprocal
agreements.
By enabling central societies to grant multi-territorial licenses, the European
Commission leaves no choice to performing rights societies but to compete against each
other. It is the Commission’s belief that competition will force these societies to reduce their
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costs and become more efficient. Ultimately, societies should be able to provide better
services to users for a cheaper price as the management cost should get lower. The result of
the interviews conducted shows that performing rights societies strongly disagree: first,
efficiency has not correlation with costs, on the opposite; technical infrastructure and
common database are costly to put in place, even when they are shared. Second, the
Commission tries to create an artificial market upon the costs to favor users, while the
primary goal of performing rights societies is to serve their members’ interests, not the ones
of the users. Third, centralization endangers the existence of small societies. The reciprocal
agreements upon which performing rights societies have been built enabled them to maintain
a local repertoire thanks to the social funds that were, arguably, primarily collected through
the use of the majors’ repertoires. The possibility given by the Recommendation for central
societies to grant cross-border licenses however puts an end to the need to refer to reciprocal
agreements. Deprived from the majors’ repertoires, the management of small societies would
be limited to the one of their local repertoire. Considering the lack of interest of users for
repertoires others than the ones of the majors, their viability would be in danger and,
consequently, cultural diversity as well.
In the end, one may regret the European Commission’s decision to treat music as any
commodity and to have forgotten the social and cultural significant roles played by European
performing rights societies since their inception. This utilitarian approach, which mirrors the
one taken in the United States for decades, contradicts the “droit d’auteur” tradition upon
which continental copyright legislations are built upon; far from fostering music creation, the
approach taken by the Commission may favor the Anglo-Saxon repertoire to the detriment of
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regional repertoires. Ultimately, local genres may thus suffer from this shift of policy in
copyright management.
At this stage, several questions remain open: will the traditional utilitarian rationale of
copyrights, i.e., to provide an incentive for creation, be defeated by the structure imposed by
political institutions to manage these copyrights? Will the fate of cultural diversity ultimately
be left to the good will of private initiatives and sponsorships as already is the case for
classical music? Will public entities have to implement quota regulations and subsidize the
music industry as already done successfully in France to protect the French movie
industry219? Or, on the contrary, will the development of digital music encourage music
creation by substantially reducing transaction costs for authors and enable the growth of niche
markets? Any answer would be premature. Truth remains that the structure of European
performing rights societies is likely to change in the coming years, and that this evolution,
driven by a balance to be found around key concepts like “centralization”, “cooperation” and
“competition”, may influence the future of music. Strangely, cultural diversity may thus
depend more upon the way musical works will be managed in the coming years than upon the
future of copyrights itself. It remains to be hoped that conglomerization of the entertainment
industry and its lobbying will not weigh the balance towards an impoverishment of cultural
diversity that would ultimately lead to a serious defeat of the very reason of being of
copyrights.
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